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THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT
Andrew Jay McClurg*
Abstract
Only two constitutional rights—the First and Second Amendments—
have a realistic capacity, through judicial interpretation or legislative
action or inaction, to confer a “right to be negligent” on private citizens;
that is, a right to engage in objectively unreasonable risk-creating conduct
without legal consequences. In the First Amendment context, for
example, the Supreme Court, in New York Times v. Sullivan and its
progeny, expressly embraced a right to be negligent in defaming public
officials and public figures to protect speech. This Article asserts that
through both common and statutory law, the United States has enshrined
a de facto Second Amendment right to be negligent in many aspects of
making, distributing, and possessing firearms, the only legal product
designed to inflict what the tort system is designed to prevent.
Explaining that it is a microcosm of a much larger issue, this Article
focuses on one area: allowing access to guns by criminals through theft.
Hundreds of thousands of guns are stolen each year from individuals and
commercial sellers. By definition, they all go directly to criminals. A
substantial percentage of guns used in crime were previously stolen.
Nevertheless, the common law has conferred near complete immunity on
gun owners and sellers who fail to secure guns from theft when they are
subsequently used to cause harm. This occurs despite frequent judicial
pronouncements that the risk of firearms demands the highest degree of
care in their use and keeping. To accomplish this result, courts ignore or
mischaracterize fundamental scope of liability principles, rarely even
reaching the question of whether reasonable care was exercised.
On the statutory front, not only have Congress and most states failed
to mandate firearms security measures, Congress has—in the name of the
Second Amendment—given express protection of the right to be
negligent, most prominently in the form of the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act. The Act immunizes manufacturers and sellers
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of guns from most tort claims, including claims against commercial
firearms licensees for negligent security leading to theft.
This Article argues that this government-endorsed lack of
responsibility results in the under-deterrence of risky conduct that, with
reasonable alterations, could avoid substantial intentional and accidental
injury costs.
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INTRODUCTION
Only two federal constitutional rights—the First and Second
Amendments—have the realistic capacity, through judicial interpretation
or legislative action, to confer a “right to be negligent” on private citizens;
that is, a right to engage in objectively unreasonable, risk-creating
conduct without legal consequences.1 In the First Amendment context,
1. “Realistic capacity” means as a practical matter under existing principles of law. In
response to a draft of this Article, Professor Eugene Volokh constructed four creative
hypotheticals to challenge my assertion that only the First and Second Amendments have the
capacity, through judicial interpretation, to confer a right to be negligent on private actors. See Email from Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, to author
(Mar. 31, 2015, 23:56 CST) (on file with author). Each hypothetical involved injuries inflicted by
a third-party criminal actor as a consequence, at least in part, of an asserted “negligent” act. Those
acts were, respectively: a man invoking his Fourth Amendment rights in response to a police
request to read his email, a woman getting an abortion, a woman entering into a lesbian
relationship, and a property owner failing to institute a state-of-the-art security system that
employed race and sex profiling. Each hypothetical contained facts assuming that the subsequent
criminal harm was a foreseeable consequence of the act in question. Professor Volokh conceded
it was unlikely any of the acts would result in tort liability but asserted that such results would
occur at least in part because of constitutional considerations. For space considerations and
because my assertion is not essential to the thesis of this Article, the hypotheticals and detailed
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for example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
and its progeny, expressly endorsed a right to be negligent in defaming
public officials and public figures to protect free speech.2 This Article
asserts that, through both common and statutory law,3 the United States
has enshrined a de facto Second Amendment right to be negligent
regarding many aspects of making, distributing, and possessing firearms,
the only legal product designed to inflict what the tort system is intended
to prevent: death and injury to human beings.4 “Right to be negligent,” as
used herein, refers to government-sanctioned behavior that fails rational
applications of risk–utility balancing—the dominant test for assessing the
reasonableness of conduct and risks under U.S. tort law.5 A consequence
discussion of them are omitted here. They are, however, worth reading and pondering and are
available on request (Professor Volokh has given permission).
My reply questioned whether the hypotheticals involved cognizable negligent acts under
existing principles of tort law. See E-mail from author, to Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz
Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Apr. 1, 2015, 10:37 CST) (on file with author). While the
definition of what constitutes unreasonable conduct is, of course, amorphous, it seems unlikely
(and no relevant cases exist of which I am aware) that invoking a constitutional right, having an
abortion, engaging in a lesbian relationship, or failing to build race and sex profiling into a
property security system would be seen as objectively unreasonable acts that fail a risk–utility
balancing analysis. Additionally, even if one or more of the hypothesized acts were considered to
be negligent, traditional scope of liability principles would most likely preclude liability because
the hypothesized criminal acts were not what made the original act negligent in the first place, at
least absent the unusual facts assumed in the hypotheticals. Nevertheless, Professor Volokh’s
point is theoretically accurate, which prompted me to add the qualifier “realistic” to the sentence
in text.
2. 376 U.S. 254, 279–88 (1964) (imposing the high hurdle of the “actual malice” test in
defamation actions brought by public officials, which requires plaintiffs to prove the defendant
knew the statements were false or published them in reckless disregard of whether they were true
or false); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730–31 (1968) (holding that proving
“reckless disregard” under the actual malice test requires evidence that the defendant subjectively
“entertained serious doubts as to the truth of” the statements and noting that this is a higher
standard than an objective test of reasonableness); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–
64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (extending the actual malice test to public figures).
3. “Statutory law” refers both to affirmative statutory protections for negligent conduct
and the omission of statutes or regulations mandating safe conduct.
4. This Article refers to “guns” and “firearms” generally, but the clear focus is on
handguns, the firearm of choice for committing homicide. Handguns were used in 5782 deaths
(68%) of the 8454 firearm homicides in 2013 for which the type of firearm could be determined.
Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States 2013 Expanded Homicide Data Table 8, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crimein-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_
data_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2009-2013.xls (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
5. Negligence under tort law is assessed by balancing the risks of conduct—both the
foreseeability of the risk manifesting itself in harm and the severity of the harm should it occur—
against the burden of eliminating or substantially reducing the risk. The standard is captured in
the definition of negligence in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
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of this government-endorsed (and, in some situations, enforced) lack of
responsibility is the under-deterrence of behavior that, with reasonable
alterations, could avoid significant intentional and accidental injury
costs.6
To allow in-depth examination, this Article focuses on only one aspect
of the issue: preventing access to guns by criminals through theft.7
Hundreds of thousands of guns are stolen each year from individuals and
commercial sellers.8 By definition, all stolen guns go directly to
criminals. A large percentage of guns used in crime were previously
stolen.9 Nevertheless, despite frequent judicial pronouncements that the
magnitude of the risk presented by firearms demands the highest degree
of care in their use and keeping,10 the common law has conferred near
complete immunity on gun owners and sellers who fail to act reasonably
to secure guns from theft when the guns are subsequently used to inflict
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under
all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the
person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the
person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that
may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2010). The standard is an iteration of Judge Learned Hand’s formula for negligence in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), where Judge Hand said conduct is
negligent if the burden of avoiding a risk is less than the probability of the risk times the severity
of the harm. Id. at 173 (“[I]t serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL.”).
6. See infra notes 205–32 and accompanying text.
7. Preventing unauthorized access to firearms is an area in which I have a longstanding
interest. See generally Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the
Negligent Storage of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189 (2000) [hereinafter McClurg, Armed and
Dangerous] (arguing for recognition of a “negligent storage” claim under tort law when one fails
to act reasonably to secure a firearm that is subsequently acquired and used to cause harm by an
unauthorized user); Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of
Firearms: Adolescent Suicides Add One More “Smoking Gun,” 51 HASTINGS L.J. 953 (2000)
(arguing for safe gun storage laws as a way to reduce adolescent suicides); Andrew J. McClurg,
Child Access Prevention Laws: A Common Sense Approach to Gun Control, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 47 (1999) [hereinafter McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws] (arguing for the adoption
and enforcement of laws criminalizing the negligent storage of firearms in situations where a
minor acquires the gun and uses it to cause harm). Parts of this Article are drawn from these prior
works.
8. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2012
SUMMARY: FIREARMS REPORTED LOST AND STOLEN 5–6 (2013), https://www.atf.gov/file/11846/
download [hereinafter 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT] (finding that 183,660 firearms were
reported stolen in 2012); see infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
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harm.11 Accomplishing that result requires courts to ignore or
mischaracterize fundamental scope of liability principles. Courts
rejecting liability in theft cases rarely even reach the question of whether
the defendants acted reasonably, choosing instead to hide behind the
avoidance mechanisms of “no duty” or “no proximate cause.”
On the statutory front, Congress and most state legislatures have not
only declined to pass laws aimed at reducing gun thefts, Congress has
given explicit protection to the right to be negligent in securing firearms
in the form of the Child Safety Lock Act of 200512 and, more
prominently, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
(PLCAA).13 The former immunizes individual gun owners from suit in
theft cases if they employ childproofing devices such as trigger locks that
do not deter theft,14 while the latter bars all claims for negligent security
against licensed firearms dealers.15
Thieves are but one type of unauthorized, dangerous firearms user.
Each year, hundreds of minors are killed and thousands more injured in
accidental shootings.16 Hundreds more die using a gun to commit
11. See infra Part II.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(1) (2012).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).
14. See infra notes 75–79, 155–64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
16. Data collected by the National Vital Statistics System showed 591 unintentional firearm
deaths in 2011. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2011, NAT’L VITAL STAT.
REP., July 27, 2015, at 41 tbl.10, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr63/nvsr63_03.pdf
(listing number of deaths by age from 113 selected causes). But see Michael Luo & Mike McIntire,
Children and Guns: The Hidden Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/children-and-guns-the-hidden-toll.html (reviewing
hundreds of child firearm deaths and concluding that “accidental shootings occurred roughly
twice as often as the records indicate, because of idiosyncrasies in how such deaths are classified
by the authorities”).
The gun debate tends to focus on deaths, but most shooting victims do not die. In 2012, 17,362
persons were injured in nonfatal, unintentional shootings. See Web-Based Injury Statistics Query
and Reporting System (WISQARS), Nonfatal Injury Reports 2001–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (select
“Unintentional” for intent of injury option, “Firearm” for cause of injury option, and “2012 to
2012” for “Year(s) of Report”; then follow “Submit Request” hyperlink).
In terms of context, 2010 data for sixteen states showed that 32.1% of accidental shooting
deaths occurred while the victim was “playing with” the firearm. Sharyn E. Parks et al.,
Surveillance for Violent Deaths—National Violent Death Reporting System, 16 States, 2010,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES, Jan. 17, 2014, at 1, 33 tbl.23,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6301a1.htm. Hunting or showing a gun to
others each comprised 13.6% of accidental deaths. Id. Regarding the known circumstances of
injury, 38.3% died as a result of unintentionally pulling the trigger and 13.6% died because they
thought the gun was unloaded or could not fire because the magazine was disengaged. Id. Nearly
45% (44.4%) of the accidental shooting deaths were unsatisfactorily classified simply as “[o]ther
mechanism of injury.” Id.
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suicide.17 Most deaths in both categories result from accessing unsecured
guns in the home.18 While access to guns by minors residing in gunowning households is not directly addressed in this Article, much of the
discussion applies to them. Although courts have shown a greater
willingness to impose legal responsibility on gun owners in home access
cases than in traditional theft cases, several decisions have protected the
right to be negligent in the former situation.19
The concentration in this Article on gun thefts is a microcosm of a
much larger issue. The right to be negligent permeates every level of the
U.S. gun market and culture, from manufacture to end use. Manufacturers
benefit from it enormously, principally in the form of the PLCAA.
Subject to some narrow exceptions, the PLCAA bars all actions against
gun manufacturers for harm caused by the criminal misuse of a firearm,20
including negligent marketing and distribution claims for failing to act
reasonably to monitor, train, or terminate corrupt or negligent dealers,
even though they are known to be the principal conduits of guns used in
17. Suicide is the third leading cause of death for fifteen to twenty-four year olds. CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, SUICIDE:

FACTS AT A GLANCE 2 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheeta.pdf. In 2010, suicides comprised six of every ten firearm deaths. See Drew DeSilver, Suicides
Account for Most Gun Deaths, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 24, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/24/suicides-account-for-most-gun-deaths/. In the
same year, 375 persons ages seventeen and younger and 1752 persons ages eighteen to twentyfour committed suicide with a gun. D’Vera Cohn et al., Gun Homicide Rate Down 49% Since
1993 Peak; Public Unaware, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 42 (May 7, 2013),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/05/firearms_final_05-2013.pdf (tabulating CDC’s
WISQARS results in a table titled “Firearm Suicide Deaths, by Age, 1981–2010”).
18. See GEO STONE, SUICIDE AND ATTEMPTED SUICIDE: METHODS AND CONSEQUENCES 12
(1999) (stating that 90% of all suicide attempts by adolescents occur in the home); Parks et al.,
supra note 16, at 11 (finding that 67% of the accidental firearms deaths included in the study
occurred in a house or apartment).
19. See, e.g., Smith v. Brooks, 545 S.E.2d 135, 135–36 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming
summary judgment for the defendant parents of minor child who accidentally shot his friend
because the plaintiffs failed to show the child had a known proclivity for misusing firearms in the
home); France v. Lambert, No. CA-8197, 1990 WL 187081, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1990)
(affirming summary judgment for the parents of minor who accidentally shot his friend with his
parents’ gun because it was not foreseeable that the son would violate house rules by having a
friend over when his parents were not home); Hughes v. Brown, 36 Va. Cir. 444, 449–50 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 1995) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant father whose son shot and injured
a friend with his father’s gun because there was no previous indication that the father’s
instructions regarding firearm safety and handling had been disobeyed).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2012) (defining a “qualified civil liability action,” which
is banned by the Act, as “a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by
any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for
damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or
penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by
the person or a third party” (emphasis added)).
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crimes, or “crime guns.”21 The PLCAA also precludes products liability
design defect claims arising from volitional acts that are classified as
unlawful, even in cases of accidental shootings that could have been
prevented by a feasible alternative design.22 Because no federal gun
21. No laws or regulations require gun makers to track their products or monitor their retail
dealers, even though it is well-known that overtly corrupt or “look the other way” dealers funnel
large numbers of guns into the hands of illegal, unauthorized users. A 2000 report by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms analyzing 1530 firearms trafficking investigations from 1996
through 1998, determined that corrupt firearms licensees were associated with more than 40,000
guns diverted into the illegal market, nearly half of the total number of trafficked firearms
involved in the investigations. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, DEP’T OF TREASURY,
FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS TRAFFICKERS ix–x (2000).
A 1995 report found that nearly 50% of traced crime guns in a particular year came from less than
1% of the nation’s firearms licensees. See GLENN L. PIERCE ET AL., NE. UNIV., THE IDENTIFICATION
OF PATTERNS IN FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOCUSED ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
11 & tbl.5 (1995) (showing that 49.4% of 121,110 crime guns in the study were traced back to
federal firearms licensees comprising less than 1% of the total number of licensed gun sellers).
Gun advocates respond that the latter figure is partly explained by the fact that a majority of
firearms are sold by large retailers, which comprise only a small percentage of total licensees. See
generally Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun Trafficking and the
Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233 (2009) (analyzing data
regarding how criminals obtain guns and attacking the “myth” that large numbers of crime guns
originate in large-scale gun-trafficking operations by licensed firearms dealers).
Prior to the PLCAA, negligent distribution claims took two basic forms: (1) oversupplying
markets with weak gun laws with far more guns than could be consumed by residents in the area,
knowing that large numbers of the guns were being diverted to the illegal market; and (2) failing
to monitor and train retailers to detect and terminate those who were either intentionally or
negligently participating in straw purchases or other transactions that diverted guns to criminals.
See TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 8–11 (2006) (summarizing negligent
marketing and distribution claims).
22. In Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. 2009), a minor accidentally shot and killed
his friend while playing with his father’s semiautomatic handgun, believing the gun to be
unloaded because the magazine was removed, id. at 745, a common type of gun accident. The
court held that the PLCAA barred a design defect claim against Beretta, manufacturer of the gun,
for failing to incorporate a device known as a magazine disconnect safety that prevents
semiautomatic pistols from firing when the magazine is removed. Id. at 750, 765. Beretta
conceded that the accident would not have occurred had a magazine disconnect been incorporated
and that the device would add $10, at most, to the cost of a $500 handgun. Id. at 749. The PLCAA
bars products liability suits “where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that
constituted a criminal offense.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). While conceding that the boy
“accidentally shot and killed his friend,” Adames, 909 N.E.2d at 745, the court held that the claim
fell under the ban because the shooter volitionally pulled the trigger and was subsequently
adjudged delinquent in juvenile court for reckless discharge of a firearm. Id. at 763. Many gun
accidents involve reckless conduct by minors or young adults. See GARY KLECK, TARGETING
GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 321 (1997) (concluding that fatal gun accidents commonly
involve adolescents and young adults and usually involve reckless behavior). One study found
that 20.3% of adults surveyed did not think a semiautomatic handgun could be fired with the
magazine removed, while another 14.5% said they did not know. Jon S. Vernick et al., “I Didn’t
Know the Gun Was Loaded”: An Examination of Two Safety Devices that Can Reduce the Risk
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safety design regulations exist,23 the absence of a threat of tort liability
leaves gun manufacturers with little incentive to implement safer gun
designs, such as personalized gun technology that would prevent
unauthorized users from operating a firearm.24 A separate article
dedicated to manufacturers and the right to be negligent could be written.
That the right to be negligent is derived from deference to Second
Amendment rights is directly shown by the PLCAA. The PLCAA begins
with a statement of “Findings,” the first of which states: “The Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”25 No other
consumer product receives federal immunity from tort liability.26
of Unintentional Firearm Injuries, 20 J. PUB. HEALTH & POL’Y 427, 430 (1999). Among
respondents who believed either that the pistol could not be discharged or did not know if it could
be discharged, 28% lived in a gun-owning household. Id.
23. Federal law imposes no safety requirements for domestic handgun designs. See Jon S.
Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as Consumer
Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1196–97 (2000) (discussing the fact that no federal agency
has the authority to impose firearm design standards). The Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), the agency charged with regulating the safety of most consumer products, is prohibited
by federal law from imposing any safety regulation on firearms or ammunition. Consumer Product
Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 3(e), 90 Stat. 503 (1976)
(“The Consumer Product Safety Commission shall make no ruling or order that restricts the
manufacture or sale of firearms, firearms ammunition, or components of firearms ammunition,
including black powder or gunpowder for firearms.”). As it is often said, the CPSC can regulate
toy guns but not real ones. E.g., Protect Children, Not Guns: The Truth About Guns, CHILDREN’S
DEFENSE FUND (July 2013), http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/data/state-datarepository/the-truth-about-guns.pdf.
24. “Smart gun” technology has been feasible for many years as suggested by the nowforgotten, defunct settlement agreement by Smith & Wesson reached in the government plaintiff
litigation in 2000, in which Smith & Wesson agreed to do the following: (1) within two years, to
equip each handgun with an internal lock that could be operated only by a key, combination, or
other mechanism unique to the gun; (2) to commit 2% of annual revenues to developing
personalized technology; and (3) within three years, to use its best efforts to incorporate
personalized technology in every new handgun design. ANDREW J. MCCLURG ET AL., GUN
CONTROL & GUN RIGHTS 348–49 (2002). Colt’s Manufacturing Co. (Colt) once saw smart guns
as a potential major growth area in the market. Stephen T. Teret & Adam D. Mernit, Personalized
Guns: Using Technology to Save Lives, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING
POLICY WITH EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 173, 177 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013).
A 1999 internal memo noted that “remarkable progress was being made” in smart gun technology.
Id. The memo came to light during discovery in a lawsuit against Colt. Id. Shortly thereafter, Colt
and other gun makers discontinued work on personalized guns. Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(1); see also Ileto v. Glock, 565 F.3d 1126, 1140 n.10 (9th Cir.
2009) (upholding the constitutionality of the PLCAA by taking “note that Congress . . . included
findings and statements of purpose related to its interest in protecting individuals’ Second
Amendment right to bear arms”).
26. The only industry other than the gun industry to receive broad statutory immunity from
civil lawsuits is the childhood vaccine industry. In 1986, Congress passed the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, setting up a compensation program to promote the development of disease
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The tie to the Second Amendment from legislative inaction and the
state of the common law is less direct, but in stolen gun cases, the nexus
is reasonably inferable because of the absence of other plausible
explanations for giving a free pass to gun possessors to exercise
unreasonable care in safeguarding the most dangerous product.27 While
it is true that courts have always been reluctant to impose tort liability on
an original negligent actor for a subsequent criminal act, as discussed in
Part II, they have done so in numerous contexts where the risk of a
criminal act is what made the original act negligent in the first place.28
One explanation for the paucity of direct references to the Second
Amendment in firearms cases is that until the Supreme Court decided
McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010,29 courts correctly assumed that the
Second Amendment had no application to state tort law.30 By that point,
the PLCAA, prohibiting most suits, was already well-entrenched.
One might argue that the immunity from responsibility for harm
caused with stolen guns is a necessary byproduct of protecting a
constitutional right, similar to the First Amendment protection of
negligent conduct in defamation actions by public officials and figures,
vaccines after a wave of lawsuits drove some small vaccine companies out of business, causing
vaccine shortages. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3755 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). But unlike the PLCAA, the
Vaccine Act set up a separate no-fault compensation fund for persons injured by vaccines funded
by an excise tax on vaccine sales. See Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 352 (2011). Compensation claims are
heard by a special court. Id. at 354–55 (discussing the compensation system under the Vaccine
Act). If a claimant is dissatisfied with the court’s award or if the court dismisses the claim, the
claimant is permitted to pursue a regular tort action. Id. at 355.
27. It is reasonable to characterize firearms in these terms because guns, at least handguns,
are the only legal product for which the intended purpose and primary utility is to kill or injure
human beings. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 453 (1999). Thus,
comparisons to other dangerous products, such as automobiles, alcohol, or baseball bats, are inapt
because their primary purposes and utilities are, respectively, transportation, recreation, and the
national pastime. See id. Professor Robert Rabin offered the distinction that one “uses” a handgun
to cause harm, whereas one “abuses” products such as alcohol in causing harm. Id.
28. See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
29. 561 U.S. 742, 790 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and making it binding on the states).
30. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 293 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (noting in a public nuisance action against several gun manufacturers that the Second
Amendment has no application to the states and citing early Supreme Court precedent to that
effect); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating in a lawsuit
asserting numerous claims against several gun manufacturers that “[t]his is a case invoking state
tort law; the Second Amendment limits only the powers of the federal government”); Hamilton
v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1317–18 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining in a negligent marketing
action against several gun manufacturers that “the Supreme Court has held that the Second
Amendment limits only the power of Congress” and does not inhibit state tort law).
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but a crucial distinction exists. Most restrictions on speech run afoul of
the First Amendment, but nothing in the history nor jurisprudence of the
Second Amendment suggests, much less guarantees, a privilege by gun
sellers and owners to act unreasonably in securing firearms from theft.
Part I of this Article explores the scope of the risk of stolen guns and
the burden of safely securing firearms from theft. Part II analyzes how
the law, through both inaction and affirmative legislative and common
law actions, has given its imprimatur to negligently safeguarding from
access by thieves. Part III asserts that the trickle-down effect of this
imprimatur is under-deterrence of unreasonable, dangerous conduct and
a mindset among many gun owners that rejects suggestions of legal
responsibility to exercise reasonable care in securing firearms.
I. STOLEN GUNS: RISKS AND BURDENS
Unauthorized access to firearms assumes two basic forms: traditional
theft and access by persons, usually minors, living in the gun owner’s
home. The distinction between the two categories blurs in situations
where an older minor or young adult who lives in or has access to a
relative’s home removes a gun from the premises and uses it for an
intentional criminal act.31 This Article focuses on traditional thefts,32 but
31. See, e.g., Jones v. Secord, 684 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2012) (granting summary judgment
to the gun owner in action alleging negligence in failing to properly secure gun and timely report
its theft by his grandson who used it to kill three people); Bridges v. Parrish, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796
(N.C. 2013) (declining to hold parents of adult son liable for negligently storing handgun when
son retrieved the gun from their home and used it to shoot his girlfriend); Estate of Heck ex rel.
Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 266 (Ind. 2003) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of action
against parents of an adult fugitive felon who retrieved defendants’ gun from their home and used
it to fatally shoot a police officer).
32. Related to negligent firearms security is the theory of negligent entrustment, which is
not part of this Article. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the doctrine of negligent
entrustment as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of
his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving
unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier
should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for
physical harm resulting to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
An essential element of a negligent entrustment claim is affirmatively supplying the chattel
to the unfit user. See id. Thus, the claim does not encompass thefts. Some courts, however, have
recognized that constructive entrustment can occur in situations where the defendant permitted
access to the chattel to a dangerous user under circumstances where the defendant knew or should
have known the person would find and misuse the chattel. See, e.g., Foster v. Arthur, 519 So. 2d
1092, 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In Foster, the defendant’s roommate took her gun, which
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much of the reasoning applies equally to access by minors in the
household. Importantly, the same measures necessary to prevent
unauthorized access to guns by thieves would also preclude unauthorized
access to guns by minors, preventing many gun accidents and suicides.33
Gun thefts occur primarily through residential and vehicle burglaries,
but also in large numbers from retail gun sellers.34 As is true of so much
data in the gun debate,35 pinning down the number of stolen guns is an
elusive quest. Survey research by Professors Philip Cook and Jens
Ludwig estimated that roughly 600,000 guns are stolen in noncommercial
thefts annually36 (an average of approximately 1600 guns a day). The
U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated, based
on its annual National Crime Victimization Survey, that 232,400 firearms
were stolen each year from 2005 through 2010 in household burglaries or
other property crimes37 (an average of approximately 635 a day).
she kept under her mattress for self-protection, and used it to shoot the plaintiff. Id. at 1093. She
never gave the roommate permission to use the gun, and, in fact, denied that she had disclosed its
whereabouts to him. See id. In upholding a claim against the defendant grounded in negligent
entrustment, the court said: “Consent to use a firearm need not be expressly given . . . . It may be
given indirectly through the conduct of the gun owner, such as when, under certain circumstances,
he provides the opportunity for another person to use the gun.” Id. at 1094. The court found
sufficient evidence in the defendant’s knowledge of her roommate’s violent past and the fact that
he knew she owned a gun to put her on notice that he might appropriate the gun with harmful
results. Id. at 1095. Because there was no evidence that the defendant actually entrusted the
firearm to the roommate, even by passive acquiescence, Foster would have been better analyzed
as a case of negligent storage, rather than negligent entrustment. See Herland v. Izatt, 345 P.3d
661, 663, 674 (Utah 2015) (holding in a negligent entrustment case where plaintiff’s decedent
shot herself with defendant’s handgun while intoxicated at a party in his home that a duty would
exist if the defendant committed either “(1) directly supplying or handing a gun to another, (2)
placing the gun within reach of another, or (3) consenting (either explicitly or implicitly) to the
use of the gun by another”).
33. See supra notes 16–17.
34. See Kleck & Wang, supra note 21, at 1293. Much less frequently, guns are stolen in
transit from commercial shippers. Reporting of In-Transit Loss and Theft of Firearms, NAT’L
SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (2015), http://www.nssf.org/factsheets/PDF/ReportingOfIntransit.pdf.
Guns stolen in transit are not specifically addressed in this Article, but the same arguments would
apply in the event negligence contributed to such a theft.
35. Current, reliable firearms data and research are woefully lacking in most areas due in
large part to actions by Congress. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Firearms Policy and the Black
Community: Rejecting the “Wouldn’t You Want a Gun If Attacked?” Argument, 45 CONN. L. REV.
1773, 1798–1800 (2013) (tracing how Congress terminated government funding of firearms
research back in the 1990s).
36. See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN AMERICA:
NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 7 (1997), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf.
37. LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS STOLEN DURING HOUSEHOLD
BURGLARIES AND OTHER PROPERTY CRIMES, 2005–2010, at 1 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fshbopc0510.pdf.
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Pursuant to an executive action issued by President Barack Obama in
the wake of the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting in
Newtown, Connecticut,38 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) compiled a report on stolen and lost guns for 2012,
finding that 173,675 guns were reported to the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) as stolen or lost from individuals.39 The
report noted that “the statistics in this report likely reveal only a fraction
of the problem,” due mostly to the lack of any mandate that individuals
report stolen guns to law enforcement or that law enforcement agencies
report stolen guns to the NCIC.40 Mandatory reporting of stolen guns
would hold gun owners more accountable for securing them, enable
better data collection, solve more crimes, and prevent some crimes from
occurring; yet only ten states and the District of Columbia have laws
requiring an individual to report a stolen firearm.41
In addition to gun thefts from individuals, thousands of guns are stolen
each year from federal firearms licensees (FFLs). Federal regulations
require FFLs to report stolen or lost guns to ATF within forty-eight hours
of the observed theft or loss.42 In 2012, FFLs reported 16,667 stolen or
lost firearms.43 Handguns were by far the most common type of firearm
reported stolen or lost.44 The 2012 report included 377 burglaries
involving the theft of 4340 guns and 662 shoplifting incidents involving
the theft of 1304 firearms.45 The actual figures are likely much higher
because stolen or missing guns often are not discovered unless and until
ATF inspects the records of an FFL.46 Historically, ATF has inspected
38. Now Is the Time: The President’s Plan to Protect Our Children and Our Communities
by Reducing Gun Violence, WHITE HOUSE 2, 7 (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf.
39. See 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
40. Id. at 2.
41. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-202g (2015); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.08 (2015); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 11, § 1461 (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-4.1 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY
§ 5-146 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 129C (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 28.430 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-19 (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.10
(McKinney 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.20(A)(5) (West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1147-48.1 (West 2015). Many individuals choose not to report stolen guns. Explanations include:
The stolen gun may have been illegal to begin with; the victim might have been carrying the gun
illegally (for example, in a car while lacking a permit); she may be uncertain whether she was
violating any laws in storing or carrying the gun; she may worry about liability or other legal
ramifications; or she might be embarrassed or concerned about being stigmatized.
42. 27 C.F.R. § 478.39a (2014).
43. 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
44. Id. at 10 tbl.4.
45. Id. at 10 tbl.3.
46. Id. at 3; see also Fred Schulte, ATF’s Struggle to Close Down Firearms Dealers;
Modest Resources, Restrictive Rules Allow Troubled Outlets to Stay Open for Years, CTR. PUB.
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only a small percentage of FFLs on an annual basis due to inadequate
funding by Congress and other hindrances.47 A report by the Justice
Department’s Office of the Inspector General found that between 2007
and 2012, more than 58% of FFLs had not been inspected for five or more
years.48 Even with increased inspection efforts under the Obama
Administration, in 2012, ATF inspected fewer than one in five FFLs.49
By definition, all stolen guns go directly to criminals. Not
surprisingly, stolen guns are a primary source of guns used in crime. In
interviews with incarcerated felons, 32% of the participants said they
acquired their most recent firearm through theft.50 The felons who
reported stealing guns had stolen, on average, about thirty-nine guns
each.51 Analyzing data pertaining to how criminals obtain guns,
criminologist Professor Gary Kleck and Dr. Shun-Yung Kevin Wang
concluded that “[t]heft is central to criminal gun acquisition” and that
“[m]ost gun theft is a by-product of residential burglary and other thefts
from private owners.”52 More data is needed, but Congress—a powerful
protector of the right to be negligent—began attaching the Tiahrt
Amendment to appropriations bills in 2003, which bars ATF from
releasing crime gun tracing data to the public and bans its admissibility
in state and federal judicial proceedings.53
Guns are profitable, desirable items for thieves. Stolen guns are
untraceable, making them valuable to those who intend to use them in
INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/02/01/12117/atfsstruggle-close-down-firearms-dealers (detailing an inspection of a Pennsylvania gun store in 2010
in which the owner of a gun shop could not account for 3000 firearms that he had bought or sold
in recent years).
47. See Schulte, supra note 46 (explaining how congressionally imposed limitations on
inspections and funding hinder ATF’s ability to inspect and shut down law-breaking firearms
licensees).
48. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF ATF’S FEDERAL
FIREARMS LICENSEE INSPECTION PROGRAM ii (2013).
49. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, Fact Sheet—FFL
Compliance Inspections (Feb. 2013), https://www.atf.gov/file/4796/download (stating that ATF
conducted 13,100 compliance inspections of 69,000 FFLs in 2012).
50. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY
OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 183 tbl.9.1 (expanded ed. 1994) (containing a well-known study
based on interviews with 2000 prisoners).
51. Id. at 198 (estimating the average number of guns stolen by felons based on survey
responses).
52. Kleck & Wang, supra note 21, at 1293.
53. See Colin Miller, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Why the Tiahrt Amendment’s Ban on the
Admissibility of ATF Trace Data in State Court Actions Violates the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 665, 667–68, 676–82 (2010) (explaining how, in 2003,
Congress began attaching the Tiahrt Amendment to appropriations acts and arguing that the ban
on admitting gun-tracing data as evidence in state courts violates the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment).
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crime.54 They are also attractive to people who are legally prohibited from
purchasing guns from licensed dealers.55 Consequently, they are prime
candidates to enter the secondary illegal gun market. As one judge said
bluntly: “The notion that it is not foreseeable that a stolen handgun will
be used in violent crime is simply nonsense.”56
The burden on individuals of securing firearms from thieves has three
components, while the burden on commercial sellers has two. The two
burdens individuals and retailers share are the effort and financial
investment required to safely secure firearms from theft. For individuals,
the third burden is the concern that a secured firearm will be unavailable
for self-defense when needed. This has long been a rallying cry by gun
rights activists against safe gun storage requirements despite the absence
of a single credible report of a person being injured because of an inability
to access a properly secured gun.57 Even the National Rifle Association
54. See Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 956 (Md. 1999) (Raker, J., concurring)
(“Stolen guns are particularly attractive to people who intend to commit violent crimes with
handguns because they are untraceable, an important characteristic to felons, and enjoy a
potentially quick turnover.”).
55. See id. (noting that “under federal and state law, felons are unable to buy handguns
legitimately from a licensed retail merchant”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (listing
categories of prohibited gun purchasers, which include any person “who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”).
56. Valentine, 727 A.2d at 956.
57. In 2000, gun rights proponent John Lott wrote an op-ed piece arguing that requiring
safe gun storage “would likely greatly increase deaths resulting from crime.” See John R. Lott,
Jr., Childproof Gun Locks: Bound to Misfire, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 1997, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB86899922428162000. I noted in response that not a single
reported case could be located in which a gun owner suffered harm because of an inability to
access a securely stored gun. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous, supra note 7, at 1213. Shortly
thereafter, gun rights activists began citing to a 2000 incident involving a pitchfork-wielding man
who attacked and murdered two children when their parents were not home. See Man in Pitchfork
Slaying Identified, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/aug/25/news/mn10333. Some gun proponents have argued that a fourteen-year-old sibling in the house at the time
could have prevented the attack if her parents’ gun had not been locked up, see, e.g., Erich Pratt,
29,
2008),
When
Gun
Safety
Locks
Kill,
GUN OWNERS AM. (Sept.
http://gunowners.org/sk0404.htm, placing them in the remarkable position of advocating leaving
unsecured firearms accessible to unsupervised children.
Other than the pitchfork case, research located only two reported incidents in which an
inability to fire or access a gun supposedly contributed to preventing a person from using a gun
in self-defense. One situation involved a home invasion allegedly set up by a relative in which a
woman attempted to fire her husband’s gun at an intruder who had killed her husband. Jamie
Satterfield, Vickie Graves Says She Tried to Shoot Intruder, Gun Wouldn’t Go Off, KNOXVILLE
NEWS SENTINEL (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/local-news/vickiegraves-shoot-intruder-testify-bill. The woman said the gun would not fire due to unspecified
safety mechanisms in the gun. Id. The other incident involved a Texas prosecutor killed during a
home invasion. Selwyn Crawford, Slain Kaufman DA’s Children Say His Guns Were out of Reach
the Night He Died, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013, 11:04 PM),
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(NRA) advises: “Store guns so they are not accessible to unauthorized
persons.”58 Guns and Ammo, the venerable gun magazine, states that
“[m]odern firearms are powerful tools that experienced shooters
understand need to be treated with respect” and that “it’s very important
to store them properly.”59 Organizations as diverse as ammunition
manufacturers and pediatrics groups recommend storing guns both
unloaded and locked.60
Superficially, it could be argued that the Supreme Court’s 2008
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller61 precludes governmentenforced safe gun storage. Heller held that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to possess a firearm in the home for selfdefense and struck down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban.62 The
Court also invalidated a restriction that any firearm in a home be kept at
all times “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20130408-children-say-mclelland-puthis-guns-away-before-he-died.ece. According to his son, the victim “kept a gun ‘in every room
of his house’” but had “gathered up all his guns and put them away in a bag” for a party the night
before “so that his guests didn’t stumble across them.” Id.
Assuming, against reason and the facts, that all three of the above cases were meritorious
examples of the pitfalls of safe gun storage, they occurred over a period of years in which millions
of unsecured guns were stolen in household burglaries and many thousands of minors died in
accidental shootings and adolescent suicides using their parents’ guns. See supra notes 16–17,
36–37 and accompanying text. During the same period, tens of millions of household burglaries
occurred in which no one reported an injury because of an inability to access a securely stored
gun. See SHANNON CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY:
VICTIMIZATION DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vd
hb.pdf (estimating that 3.7 million household burglaries occur each year).
58. NRA Gun Safety Rules, NRA PROGRAMS & SERVS., http://training.nra.org/nra-gunsafety-rules.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The full passage states:
Store guns so they are not accessible to unauthorized persons. Many factors must
be considered when deciding where and how to store guns. A person’s particular
situation will be a major part of the consideration. Dozens of gun storage devices,
as well as locking devices that attach directly to the gun, are available. However,
mechanical locking devices, like the mechanical safeties built into guns, can fail
and should not be used as a substitute for safe gun handling and the observance
of all gun safety rules.
Id.
59. B. Gil Horman, G&A Basics: How to Store Your Gun, GUNS & AMMO (Oct. 16, 2012),
http://www.gunsandammo.com/home-featured/ga-basics-how-to-store-your-gun/ (emphasis
omitted).
60. See Mark D. Polston & Douglas S. Weil, Unsafe by Design: Using Tort Actions to
Reduce Firearm-Related Injuries, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 14 (1997) (citing
recommendations by Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute and American
Academy of Pediatrics that guns be stored unloaded and locked).
61. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
62. Id. at 635.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1

16

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

similar device”63 on the basis that the prohibition rendered the right to
self-defense meaningless.64 But as subsequent cases have held, laws that
preserve a right to immediate self-defense by requiring safe storage
whenever the gun is not under the control of the owner do not run afoul
of Heller.65
It is not the goal of this Article, nor would it be possible, to articulate
what reasonable care requires under all circumstances with regard to
firearm security. As the circumstances change, the amount of required
care changes.66 As a general observation, apart from keeping the gun
under one’s immediate control, a sturdy, non-portable gun safe is the
most secure option for preventing unauthorized access.67 Today, there are
nearly as many types and styles of gun safes as there are types of guns.68
Many safes provide quick-pad combination or biometric locks, activated
by hand or fingerprint recognition, allowing quick access.69 Many small

63. Id. at 630.
64. Id.
65. See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C 09-2143 RS, 2012 WL 3580525, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (upholding a San Francisco ordinance requiring handguns that are “not
under direct, personal control” within the home to have trigger locks or be stored in locked containers);
Commonwealth v. Reyes, 982 N.E.2d 504, 506 (Mass. 2013) (upholding the same statute, concluding
that “the statute is neither impermissibly vague nor violative of [the defendant’s] right to self-defense”);
Commonwealth v. McGowan, 982 N.E.2d 495, 496 (Mass. 2013) (upholding a Massachusetts statute
requiring firearms not under the owner’s control to be stored in a locked container or equipped with a
safety device that renders the firearm operable only by the authorized user).
66. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
67. See Horman, supra note 59 (“Simply stated, gun safes are the most secure gun storage option
available to the average gun owner.”).
68. Review websites such as GunSafeReviewsGuy.com and GunSafeAdvisor.com offer useful
information about the many different types of gun safes available. Honest Gun Safe Reviews, GUN SAFE
REVIEWS GUY, http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016); The Ultimate Gun Safe Buying
Guide, GUN SAFE ADVISOR, http://www.gunsafeadvisor.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). There
appears to be a general consensus among safe reviewers regarding some of the top brands, although not
necessarily the particular model. See, e.g., Best Gun Safe, GUN SAFE REVIEWS GUY,
http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/buyers-guide/best-gun-safe/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2015)
(recommending the AMSEC BF gun safe); Total Security in a Small Space—Best Gun Safes for
Apartments, GUN SAFE ADVISOR, http://www.gunsafeadvisor.com/total-security-in-a-small-spacebest-gun-safes-for-apartments/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2015) (recommending the AMSEC DV652
Defense Vault). Across review sites, reviewers warn customers to not let cost deter them from investing
in a high-quality gun safe. See Marc Weber Tobias, Unsafe Gun Safes Can Be Opened by a ThreeYear
Old,
FORBES
(July
27,
2012,
11:32
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcwebertobias/2012/07/27/unsafe-gun-safes-can-be-opened-by-athree-year-old/ (describing dangers of unsecure gun safes and the ways in which they can be easily
circumvented).
69. See generally What to Look For in a Gun Safe, GUN SAFE REVIEWS GUY,
http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2015) (discussing different features of gun safes);
The Ultimate Gun Safe Buying Guide, supra note 68.
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safes are designed to be permanently mounted or secured with a cable.70
No safe is foolproof, but reasonable care does not require foolproof
measures. Alternatively, a gun owner concerned about not being able to
obtain quick access to a handgun can keep the gun under his immediate
control.71
For commercial sellers, the burden of securing guns is lower in one
regard and higher in another. It is lower because the immediate self-defense
burden is absent. It is higher because, with so many guns in one place, the
magnitude of the risk demands more extensive security measures. In terms
of specifics, as detailed in Part II, ATF makes detailed recommendations to
firearms licensees regarding proper gun security,72 while nine states and the
District of Columbia impose specific security measures on gun sellers by
statute.73
II. THE LAW’S IMPRIMATUR OF THE RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT
Having explored the risks of stolen guns and the burdens of reducing the
risks, this Part explores the Article’s thesis that the law, through both inaction
and affirmative action, has created a de facto right to be negligent in failing
to secure access to firearms by unauthorized users.
A. Imprimatur Through Inaction
A principal means by which the law has given its imprimatur to
unreasonable conduct with regard to gun security is through the failure to
affirmatively demand reasonable conduct via statutes or regulations.
Guns in Homes. No federal or state law mandates that guns in homes or
vehicles be securely stored to prevent theft.74 In 2005, Congress passed the
70. See Gun Safe Buyer’s Guide, GUN SAFE REVIEWS GUY, http://gunsafereviewsguy.com/
buyers-guide/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
71. See MASSAD AYOOB, GUN SAFETY IN THE HOME 66–70 (Corrina Peterson ed., 2014)
(discussing the two options for safe firearms storage in the home as either keeping the gun in a safe or
under the immediate control of the owner).
72. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
73. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
74. Among states, only Massachusetts has a mandatory safe storage law of broad applicability
and even that law would not necessarily protect guns from theft. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140,
§ 131L(a) (West 2015) (“It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm . . . in any place unless such
weapon is secured in a locked container or equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other
safety device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other than the
owner or other lawfully authorized user.”). Three states—California, Connecticut, and New York—
mandate safe gun storage in specific circumstances. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25135 (West 2015)
(mandating safe gun storage if firearm owner knows or has reason to know that a co-dweller is
prohibited by state or federal law from possessing a firearm); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-37i (West
2015) (requiring safe storage of loaded guns if another resident is ineligible to possess a firearm under
state or federal law or “poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other
individuals”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.45 (McKinney 2015) (mandating safe gun storage if a firearm
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Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, which requires all gun makers and sellers to
furnish a “secure gun storage or safety device”75 with the sale of any
handgun.76 Gun makers and sellers comply with the law by supplying an
inexpensive childproofing trigger lock or cable lock, often accompanied by
a hard plastic case with predrilled holes for a padlock, all of which can be
easily defeated.77 Use of the supplied device is not mandated by the law, but
if it is used, the Act confers tort immunity on the gun owner for harm
resulting from theft by a criminal misuser,78 despite the fact that the safety
devices are childproofing measures, not theft deterrent devices.79
At least twenty-five states have some form of a Child Access Prevention
law,80 commonly called a CAP law.81 These laws do not mandate safe
owner lives with one who has been convicted of a felony, adjudicated as a mental defective or
committed to a mental institution, or convicted of domestic violence).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) (2012). See infra note 155 for full statutory definition.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(1) (making it unlawful for any importer, manufacturer, or dealer to sell
or transfer a handgun without a secure gun storage or safety device as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(34)).
77. See Marc Weber Tobias, The Lockdown: Gun Locks—Unsafe at Any Caliber, ENGADGET
(June 13, 2007, 1:08 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2007/06/13/the-lockdown-gun-locks-unsafe-atany-caliber/ (showing photos of both types of locks and discussing how they can be easily thwarted
even by children); see also Alex Blate, Project ChildUnsafe: Gun Safety Fail, YOUTUBE (Dec. 31,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1U0CHhDm8EY (demonstrating how to unlock a cable
gun lock in less than ten seconds using a piece of metal from a windshield wiper insert and other simple
tools); mmatt, Trigger Lock Removal with a Screwdriver, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P397UsoyNBc (demonstrating how to remove a trigger lock with
a small screwdriver and asserting that an eleven-year-old boy with an imagination could figure out how
to remove one). Trigger locks and cable locks are the two types of basic gun locks. Horman, supra note
59. Both of them are childproofing locks, not theft deterrent locks. See id. Trigger locks, as the name
suggests, are affixed around the trigger to prevent it from being pulled. Id. Cable locks are used
primarily in semiautomatic handguns. The cable is looped through the barrel or the grip where the
magazine is inserted and locked with a padlock or combination lock. Id.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3) (granting tort immunity in state and federal courts for one who uses a
“secure gun storage or safety device” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) in the event someone gains
unauthorized access to the gun and criminally misuses it).
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-217a, 29-37i (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 72507.02 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1456 (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.174
(West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-101.1 (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-10.5,
707-714.5 (West 2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-9 (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 724.22(7) (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.110 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 4-104 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131L (West 2015); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.666 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.060 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202.300 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650-C:1 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-15
(West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-315.1 (West 2015); 2014 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 193; 18
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110.1 (West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-60.1
(West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1320 (West 2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.13 (West
2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-509.5 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56.2 (West 2015);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.55 (West 2015).
81. See, e.g., McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws, supra note 7, at 61–69 (exploring
the details of state CAP laws).
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firearm storage but rather make it a crime, usually a misdemeanor,82 for
a gun owner to negligently store a loaded firearm in the event a child
(protected ages vary by state) gains access to the weapon and uses it to
cause harm to herself or another.83 CAP laws typically include a list of
defenses, including a “safe storage” defense.84 The law is not violated if
the gun was stored with a trigger lock or in a gun safe or other lockbox.85
While no data exists, anecdotally, prosecutors rarely pursue charges
under CAP laws. In cases where a gun owner’s child has been killed,
prosecutors are perhaps understandably reluctant to add more pain and
misery.86
Retail Gun Dealers. Acknowledging it is well-known that thieves
target gun stores searching for vulnerabilities,87 ATF makes extensive
recommendations to FFLs for properly securing and handling guns.88
These include detailed recommendations for structural security,
inventory security, employee screening, safe business practices, customer
safety, and disaster preparedness.89 But none of ATF’s recommendations
82. See id. at 63. The statutes do not provide for civil liability. Id. at 53. But see CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-571g (West 2015) (imposing strict liability “when a minor or, a resident of the
premises who is ineligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law or who poses a risk of
imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals, obtains a firearm . . . and
causes the injury or death of such minor, resident or any other person”).
83. McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws, supra note 7, at 50, 61.
84. Id. at 64.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 68–69.
87. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SAFETY AND SECURITY INFORMATION FOR FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEES 8 (2010) [hereinafter
ATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO FFLS] (“Experience has shown that in many instances, the thieves
spend a considerable amount of time evaluating these businesses to determine and capitalize on
their vulnerabilities.”).
88. See id. at 8–15 (offering detailed recommendations for securing firearms in retail
establishments).
89. The ATF guidance includes recommendations regarding the following: Structural
Security (evaluate business location, door and window locks, windows and doorjambs, other
unsecured openings such as window air conditioner openings, walls and ceilings, exterior lighting
and surrounding structures, shrubs and trees, and front windows and entrance; obtain and evaluate
an alarm system and protect alarm codes; evaluate need for a video camera system, installation of
a remotely activated electronic security entrance, and store layout during business hours and after
business hours, including a “best business practice” recommendation “to remove all firearms from
display cases and racks and place them in a gun vault at night”); Inventory Security (conduct
periodic physical inventories, accurately record physical inventory, require two-party inventories,
protect inventory records, keep timely acquisition and disposition records, examine firearms
shipments to determine accuracy, and keep display cases locked at all times); Employee Screening
(institute an employee background screening, require proof of identity, and discuss questions with
local police or ATF); Safe Business Practices (show only one firearm at a time to a customer,
disable display firearms, do not leave a customer who is handling a firearm unattended, keep
ammunition stored separately from firearms and out of reach of customers, do not meet with
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have the force of law. They merely provide “guidance” and “ideas.”90
Only nine states and the District of Columbia have laws imposing
security requirements on gun retailers.91 As an example, California,
which has among the nation’s strictest gun laws, requires that during nonbusiness hours, gun sellers must store firearms in a secure facility that is
part of the premises, secure firearms with a locked hardened steel rod or
cable through the trigger guard of the firearm that is shielded from the
use of a bolt-cutter, or store firearms in a locked fireproof safe or vault
on the licensee’s business premises.92
A comparative indicator of how society tolerates conduct by firearms
dealers that increases the risk of guns being stolen or otherwise diverted
to criminal users can be found by examining Colorado’s laws regarding
recreational marijuana. While the federal government and forty-one
states (including Colorado) have declined to mandate security measures
for retail gun dealers, the Colorado Constitution and regulations adopted
pursuant thereto require security measures for recreational marijuana
retailers.93 ATF only recommends conducting background checks on
customers after hours or off site, and wipe down all countertops and doors each night (because it
is easier to capture fingerprints from a clean surface in the event of a break-in), do not leave
counter and safe keys in the cash register at night, ship firearms in a way that requires signatures
or recording of transfers, provide safety and security training for employees, familiarize
employees with firearms laws, record a description of suspicious persons and their vehicles, post
theft warning notices in conspicuous locations, request assistance of local law enforcement
authorities, strictly control firearms at gun shows, and do not advertise that business is
unprotected, such as by leaving a sign or voicemail message that business is closed); Customer
Safety (insist on complete firearms safety, recommend safe storage methods, provide customers
with ATF Publication 3312.8, Personal Firearms Record, so they can record information about
their firearms in the event of theft or loss); and Disaster Preparedness (prepare a disaster plan to
protect business inventory and the public from the risk of firearms theft in the event of an
impending disaster). Id.
90. ATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO FFLS, supra note 87, at 8.
91. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-79 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26890(a)–(b) (West 2015);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-37d (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2504.07 (West 2015); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 123 (West 2015); MINN. R. 7504.0200–.0400 (2015); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 624.7161(2)–(3) (West 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 13:54-3.11, 13:54-6.1 to -6.5 (2015);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-2(a) (West 2015); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113 (West
2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-40(b) (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-10(a)(1)
(West 2015).
92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26890.
93. Part 5 of Amendment 64, which legalized recreational marijuana, addresses the
“Regulation of marijuana” and required the Department of Revenue to develop safety regulations
in categories, including “(IV) Security requirements for marijuana establishments” and “(V)
Requirements to prevent the sale or diversion of marijuana and marijuana products to persons
under the age of twenty-one.” COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5) (West, Westlaw through Nov.
2014 amendments); see also 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 R 305 (2015) (imposing security
standards for retail and cultivation marijuana facilities, including continuous alarm monitoring,
minimum lock standards, limited access areas, and perimeter fencing).
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employees of FFLs,94 but Colorado requires them for all owners and
employees of marijuana retailers.95 Colorado also imposes an inventory
control model known as MITS (Marijuana Inventory Tracking System)
in which legal marijuana must be tracked from “seed to sale” to prevent
diversion of legal marijuana into the illegal market.96
Guns result in more than 30,000 deaths annually.97 A 2014 study by
German researchers claims to have documented “the first [two] cases of
fatal cannabis smoking.”98 Other evidence shows little threat of physical
harm from marijuana use.99 For a variety of reasons, it makes good sense
to have security requirements for the marijuana industry designed to
prevent theft or diversion of marijuana into the criminal market, but good
sense, as well as rational risk–utility balancing, also demands security
requirements in the distribution and sale of firearms to prevent access by
illegal users.
B. Imprimatur Through Action
Both the common law and statutory law have bolstered the right to be
negligent in allowing guns to get into the hands of dangerous,
unauthorized users. Most of the discussion below focuses on the common
law. As referenced in the Introduction, statutory protection of the right to
94. See supra note 89 (discussing ATF’s recommendation for background checks for
employees of FFLs).
95. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 R 201(E)(1) (2015) (stating that license applicants “must
be comprised of individuals . . . [w]hose criminal history background checks establish they are all
of Good Moral Character”).
96. See id. at R 309 (specifying that it is “essential to regulate, monitor, and track all Retail
Marijuana to eliminate diversion, inside and outside of the state, and to ensure that all marijuana
grown, processed, sold and disposed of in the Retail Marijuana market is transparently accounted
for”).
97. Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8,
2013, at 1, 11, 83 tbl.18, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf (showing that
in 2010, 31,672 persons died from firearm injuries, accounting for 17.5% of all U.S. injury deaths,
and that 61.2% of the deaths were the result of suicides and 35.0% were the result of homicides).
These figures have been relatively stable for several years. Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final
Data for 2012, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Aug. 13, 2015, at 1, 10, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr63/nvsr63_09.pdf.
98. Benno Hartung et al., Sudden Unexpected Death Under Acute Influence of Cannabis,
237 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e11, e11 (2014).
99. See Daniel Fuster et al., No Detectable Association Between Frequency of Marijuana
Use and Health or Healthcare Utilization Among Primary Care Patients Who Screen Positive for
Drug Use, 29 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 133, 136 (2013) (concluding that there is no association
between frequency of marijuana use and healthcare utilization and stating the study results
“suggest that the frequency of marijuana use among patients who screen positive for drugs in
primary care may not be associated with identifiable negative health outcomes”). To die from
marijuana alone, one would have to ingest a dose of 1000 times the normal dose. Robert S. Gable,
The Toxicity of Recreational Drugs, 94 AM. SCIENTIST 206, 207 (2006).
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be negligent from the PLCAA primarily benefits gun manufacturers and
distributors by barring most suits against them.100 Manufacturers and
distributors are outside the scope of this Article. Thus, statutory analysis
of the right to be negligent in this Section is limited to the tort immunity
provision of the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005 and a provision of the
PLCAA that has been interpreted to prohibit lawsuits against gun retailers
for negligent security resulting in theft and subsequent criminal harm.
A logical starting point of a common law tort analysis is the oftrepeated judicial principle that the magnitude of the danger presented by
firearms requires one handling or caring for them to exercise the highest
degree of care.101 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that “those
who deal with firearms . . . are required to exercise the closest attention
and the most careful precautions, not only in preparing for their use but
in using them.”102 In the context of negligent storage, the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that “firearms are so inherently dangerous . . . that
a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of reasonable care will take
cautious preventive measures commensurate with the great harm that
may ensue from the use of the gun by someone unfit to be entrusted with
it.”103 A California appellate court said that “a person dealing with a
[handgun] is held to the highest standard of due care, even a slight
deviation from which may constitute negligence in the safeguarding of
100. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
101. As in all negligence cases, the required standard of conduct with regard to firearms is
reasonable care under the circumstances. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 32, at 175 (West 5th ed. 1984). Although the standard of care is static under negligence
law, the amount of necessary care varies with the circumstances. Using firearms as an example,
the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains the distinction:
While judicial opinions sometimes say that an actor who engages in a particularly
dangerous activity—for example, the supplying of electricity, or the handling of
gasoline or firearms—is subject to a “high degree of care,” this language implies
no departure from the general approach set forth in this Section [regarding the
normal standard of care]. Rather, it signifies that given the great magnitude of
the risk, the balancing approach imposes on the actor an obligation of great
precautions.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. f (AM. LAW.
INST. 2010); see also KEETON ET AL., supra, § 34, at 208 (“The amount of care demanded by the
standard of reasonable conduct must be in proportion to the apparent risk. As the danger becomes
greater, the actor is required to exercise caution commensurate with it. Those who deal with
instrumentalities that are known to be dangerous . . . must exercise a great amount of care because
the risk is great. They may be required to take every reasonable precaution suggested by
experience or prudence.” (footnotes omitted)).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
103. Stoelting v. Hauck, 159 A.2d 385, 387, 389, 396 (N.J. 1960) (reviewing jury verdict
against parents of fifteen-year-old girl for negligent storage of a pistol used by the girl to shoot
the plaintiff and reversing the verdict on other grounds).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/1

22

McClurg: The Second Amendment Right to be Negligent

2016]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT

23

such a dangerous instrument.”104 Numerous other courts have made
similar pronouncements.105 As discussed below, rarely in the annals of
law has such a universally recognized principle been honored so largely
in the breach.
1. Thefts from Individuals
Courts have generally refused to hold gun owners liable for harm,
either accidental or intentionally inflicted, caused by a third-party actor
using a stolen gun, regardless of whether the gun was unreasonably stored
or secured. The tools they use to accomplish this result—that is, to elevate
the right to be negligent—are those wayward twins of different mothers,
duty and proximate cause,106 along with their shady cousin,
foreseeability. Both duty and proximate cause are pure policy
determinations107 and are two ways of asking the same question: as a
matter of fairness and public policy, should the law extend tort liability
104. Reida v. Lund, 18 Cal. App. 3d 698, 704 (Ct. App. 1971) (citation omitted).
105. See, e.g., Bridges v. Dahl, 108 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1939) (stating that the utmost
caution must be exercised by those in possession and control of dangerous instrumentalities such
as firearms and explosives); Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Kan. 1998) (characterizing a
handgun as a dangerous instrumentality requiring the highest degree of care in safeguarding);
Estate of Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 671 (Mont. 1996) (stating that a firearm is a dangerous
instrumentality requiring a higher degree of care in use and handling); Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral
Co., 18 S.E.2d 412, 417 (N.C. 1942) (stating that those having possession and control of
dangerous instrumentalities such as firearms and explosives owe the highest degree of care and
that utmost caution must be exercised in their care and custody); Jacobs v. Tyson, 407 S.E.2d 62,
64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (classifying a firearm as an “inherently dangerous instrumentality” that
imposes on users a duty to employ “exceptional precautions to prevent injury” and distinguishing
firearms from other products that are capable of being used to inflict harm, such as knives and
golf clubs, because of the unusual dangers presented by firearms (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Glean v. Smith, 156 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1967))).
106. This Article uses the term “proximate cause” to refer to scope of liability issues because
it is the term most often used by courts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM 6 Spec. Note (AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (explaining that while previous
Restatements of Torts did not mention the term “proximate cause,” it is the term most often used
by judges, lawyers, and legal scholars). The Restatement (Third) of Torts refers to the concept as
“Scope of Liability,” which “more accurately describes the concerns of [the applicable chapter]:
Tort law does not impose liability on an actor for all harm factually caused by the actor’s tortious
conduct.” Id.
107. As Judge William Andrews famously said about proximate cause in his dissent in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, “What we . . . mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace
a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.” 162 N.E. 99,
103 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Similarly, Dean William Prosser observed
about duty that it “is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection” and is merely “a shorthand statement
of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 101, § 53.
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in the particular circumstances at issue? 108
Invoking proximate cause and duty as immunity shields in stolen gun
cases—without ever reaching the issue of the reasonableness of the
defendant’s conduct—amounts to a judicial declaration that public policy
does not support requiring gun owners and sellers to act reasonably to
secure guns from theft. While, for reasons suggested earlier, the cases do
not directly invoke the Second Amendment,109 it is the most viable
explanation underlying the refusal to evaluate the reasonableness of
conduct leading to gun thefts.
To the extent anything resembling a legal test exists for determining
the existence of a tort duty or proximate cause, it is “reasonable
foreseeability” of the harm.110 In the context of criminal acts, section
302B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “An act or an
omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of
the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though
such conduct is criminal.”111 Section 448 specifically addresses
proximate cause, providing that criminal acts by third persons are
generally considered superseding causes “unless the actor at the time of
his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that
such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.”112
108. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 101, § 53 (“[T]he question of what is ‘proximate’ and
that of duty are fundamentally the same: whether the interests of the plaintiff are to be protected
against the particular invasion by the defendant’s conduct.”). The intertwining of duty and
proximate cause is so complete that, as the Prosser and Keeton hornbook observes, it is possible
to restate every question involving proximate cause in terms of whether the defendant owed a
duty to protect the plaintiff from the harm that occurred. See id. § 42.
109. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt.
e (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Currently, virtually all jurisdictions employ a foreseeability (or risk)
standard for some range of scope of liability issues in negligence cases.”).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (AM. LAW INST. 1965). A comment to this
section states that “[n]ormally the actor has much less reason to anticipate intentional misconduct”
than merely negligent conduct. Id. § 302B cmt. d. However, another comment clarifies that a
reasonable person is required to anticipate and guard against even criminal misconduct “where
the actor’s own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of
risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account.” Id.
§ 302B cmt. e. The Restatement (Third) of Torts collapsed the sections from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts relating to liability for negligent acts that facilitate harm, including criminal
harm, by third parties into a section titled “Conduct That Is Negligent Because of the Prospect of
Improper Conduct by the Plaintiff or a Third Party.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Section 19 provides: “The conduct
of a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits the
improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.” Id.
112. Id. § 448.
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For the obvious policy reason that it seems unfair to hold an actor who
was merely negligent responsible for another’s intentional criminal act,
courts traditionally have been more likely to treat criminal acts as
superseding causes than other types of intervening forces. Nevertheless,
as the above Restatement sections and a large body of case law
indicate,113 liability is appropriate when the criminal act was within the
scope of the original risk. Liability is commonly imposed in the area of
inadequate security on business premises that facilitates a criminal
attack,114 against defendants who leave keys in automobiles when the
vehicles are stolen and involved in crashes,115 and in a diverse array of
other situations where an original negligent actor created a risk of a
subsequent criminal act.116
Significantly, the advent of comparative responsibility brought on by
the abrogation of joint and several liability in most states has substantially
undermined the fairness rationale for holding that criminal acts facilitated
by negligence are superseding causes, so much so that the Restatement
(Third) of Torts suggests that a separate body of law for intervening and
superseding causes is no longer needed.117 Because fact finders in most
states are now asked to apportion responsibility among multiple
defendants on a percentage basis, it is no longer a concern that a less113. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Silva v. Showcase Cinemas Concessions of Dedham, Inc., 736 F.2d 810, 812–
13 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the defendant’s failure to adequately patrol premises was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s stabbing); Kroger Co. v. Knox, 98 So. 3d 441, 442–43 (Miss.
2012) (reasoning that a business has a duty to exercise reasonable care in securing its parking lot
against the criminal actions of third parties if “an atmosphere of violence exist[ed] on the
premises”); Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 768 (La. 1999) (reasoning that if
the foreseeability and gravity of harm are high, a business has a duty to protect patrons from the
criminal actions of third parties in the parking lot); McClung v. Delta Square, Ltd., 937 S.W.2d
891, 902 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that businesses have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect
customers from criminal attacks in parking lots if the criminal acts are reasonably foreseeable).
115. See generally Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Liability for Personal Injury or
Property Damage Caused by Unauthorized Use of Automobile Which Had Been Parked with Keys
Removed from Ignition, 70 A.L.R.4th 276 (2000) (showing a collection of cases with this issue).
116. See, e.g., Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 451–52 (Ky. 1991) (holding that even if
the spark that ignited trash left to accumulate next to building was intentional, the resulting fire
could be found to be foreseeable); Garceau v. Engel, 210 N.W. 608, 608 (Minn. 1926) (holding
the defendant who leased space in the plaintiff’s jewelry store was liable for leaving a key in the
door when she went on vacation, resulting in a burglary); Christensen v. Epley, 585 P.2d 416,
419, 422 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the defendant who took a dangerous juvenile into
custody could be liable for failing to restrain him when a stabbing death occurred after he
escaped).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Were it not for the long history of intervening and superseding causes
playing a significant role in limiting the scope of liability, this Section [pertaining to intervening
and superseding causes] would not be necessary.”).
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culpable actor will be held responsible for the entirety of the harm.118
Meanwhile, a review of existing case law demonstrates the elaborate
lengths to which courts have gone to avoid placing responsibility on gun
owners to secure from theft the only legal consumer product designed to
kill people. Chronologically and perhaps symbolically, an appropriate
point of departure is Romero v. National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc., an
action asserting negligence in failing to secure a gun that was stolen in a
burglary from the organization’s national headquarters and used to
murder plaintiff’s decedent in a robbery.119 A jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the NRA’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.120 In affirming the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the court of appeals concluded that the
events were too “extraordinary and unforeseeable,” opining that it would
require a “prophecy” to have predicted their occurrence.121 No prophecy
would have been required, however, had the court not misapplied
fundamental scope of liability principles. The court suggested that
reasonable foreseeability could be established only if the defendant could
have foreseen each of the following events:
[1] Lowe’s [the NRA employee] storage of the weapon, [2]
a burglary of the annex, [3] a search of Lowe’s desk, [4]
discovery of his hidden closet key, [5] a search of the closet,
[6] discovery of the gun and ammunition, [7] use of the gun
in a robbery, [8] Gonzalez’[s] [the victim] resistance to the
robbery, [9] and the ultimate murder of Gonzalez by
someone not a party to the original burglary.122
But the foreseeability question is not narrowly tailored to whether the
actor could foresee this happening, then that, then this, then that, etc. It
is basic “hornbook law”123 that “[i]f the actor’s conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.”124 The
118. See id.
119. 749 F.2d 77, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 78–79.
121. Id. at 80–81.
122. Id.
123. As Professor Dan Dobbs explains in his Torts hornbook: “The defendant is liable for
harms he negligently caused so long as a reasonable person in his position should have recognized
or foreseen the general kind of harm the plaintiff suffered. He is not ordinarily relieved of liability
merely because the manner of injury or its details were unforeseeable.” DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 189 (West 2000).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The Restatement
(Third) of Torts omits a specific provision of this type, but explains in a comment:
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relevant foreseeability question is whether the harm that resulted was
within the scope of the original risk. The Restatement (Third) of Torts
defines “scope of liability” (i.e., proximate cause) in precisely these
terms: “An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the
risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”125 Another way to frame the
question is to ask whether the harm that occurred (a criminal harm with
a stolen gun) is part of the risk that made an actor’s conduct (failing to
adequately secure a gun from theft) negligent in the first place.126
Romero is certainly disputable on the facts. It is not a clear-cut case of
negligent conduct. But the case is important for adopting a flawed legal
analysis that became a “go to” method for disposing of stolen gun cases.
A more extreme case applying the same reasoning is Strever v. Cline,
where the Montana Supreme Court relieved a gun owner of liability for
leaving a loaded handgun in an unlocked vehicle on a public street.127
Inside the vehicle in plain view were several items likely to attract the
attention of thieves, including a radar detector, binoculars, fishing rod,

Mechanisms [i.e., the manner in which harm results] are important so long as
they bear, in a general and reasonable way, on the risks that were created by the
tortious conduct in the circumstances that existed at the time. Beyond that, details
of the causal forces that concurred to cause the harm and their individual or
combinational foreseeability are unimportant to the inquiry on the scope of
liability.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. o (AM.
LAW INST. 2010). In other words, the specific manner in which a harm occurred is important only
in determining whether the harm that resulted was part of the risk that made the original conduct
negligent.
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
126. See id. § 29 cmt. b (“Courts should craft instructions that inform the jury that, for
liability to be imposed, the harm that occurred must be one that results from the hazards that made
the defendant’s conduct tortious in the first place.”). An illustration illuminates the relevant scope
of the risk inquiry:
Richard, a hunter, finishes his day in the field and stops at a friend’s house while
walking home. His friend’s nine-year-old daughter, Kim, greets Richard, who
hands his loaded shotgun to her as he enters the house. Kim drops the shotgun,
which lands on her toe, breaking it. Although Richard is negligent for giving Kim
his shotgun, the risk that makes Richard negligent is that Kim might shoot
someone with the gun, not that she would drop it and hurt herself (the gun was
neither especially heavy nor unwieldy). Kim’s broken toe is outside the scope of
Richard’s liability, even though Richard’s tortious conduct was a factual cause
of Kim’s harm.
Id. § 29 cmt. d, illus. 3.
127. 924 P.2d 666, 667–68 (Mont. 1996).
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and case of cassette tapes.128 Some boys entered the pickup truck and
stole several of the items then returned looking for more items to steal.129
Under the driver’s seat they found a bag containing a .22 caliber
semiautomatic pistol and ammunition.130 As one of the boys attempted to
remove the loaded magazine from the gun, it discharged, killing the
eleven-year-old victim.131
The court rejected liability on the basis that the sequence of events
leading to the shooting was not sufficiently foreseeable to satisfy
proximate cause.132 As in Romero, the court erred in focusing on the
foreseeability of the precise chain of events rather than the general
foreseeable risk of leaving a loaded gun in an unlocked vehicle on a
public street.133 The court considered it significant that the boys came
back to the vehicle twice.134 Who could have predicted that? And the
shooter had smoked marijuana.135 Who could have known? The shooter
was also waving the gun around recklessly.136 Actually, that aspect of the
incident was all too foreseeable, as many fatal gun accidents involve
minors behaving recklessly.137 But it is all beside the point because those
were the wrong questions. The relevant question was whether someone
being shot with a stolen gun is within the scope of the risk of leaving a
loaded handgun in an unlocked vehicle on a public street.138
128. Id. at 668.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 667.
132. Id. at 674. Judicial willingness to decide the question of foreseeability, which is usually
a jury question, in stolen gun cases represents perhaps another tentacle of the right to be negligent.
133. The court explained:
Here, not only were there two intervening criminal acts (two thefts from Susanj’s
vehicle), but there was also an intervening grossly negligent act (Cline, high on
marijuana, waving the stolen gun around with his finger on the trigger, then
trying to unload the weapon). Accordingly, on these facts, we conclude that
reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion—that the series of
intervening acts which included two criminal acts and one grossly negligent act
was reasonably unforeseeable and, thereby, cut off all liability on the part of
Susanj for Robert Strever’s unfortunate death.
Id. at 674.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See KLECK, supra note 22, at 321 (asserting that most fatal gun accidents involve
adolescents and young adults engaging in reckless behavior).
138. For other stolen gun cases involving similar reasoning, see James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d
875, 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the homeowner was not liable when a high school
student stole the homeowner’s gun and ammunition and then used the gun to murder three students
at school because “[t]he law does not view as foreseeable the intentional criminal acts of a third
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A case suggesting the unstated infiltration of the Second Amendment
in this area is McGrane v. Cline.139 The gun used to commit the murder
was either stolen from the defendants’ home by a friend of their sixteenyear-old daughter or given to the assailant by the daughter who was left
alone for the weekend while the parents were out of town.140 The parents
left the gun unlocked in their master bedroom.141 The court refused to
impose a duty even though it insisted that firearm thefts from homes are
readily foreseeable142 but punted the case by concluding without
elaboration that “there are too many issues of legitimate public debate
concerning the private ownership and storage of firearms.”143 As already
explained, however, there is no legitimate debate regarding the proper
storage of firearms. All experts agree that guns should be securely stored
to keep them out of the hands of unauthorized users.144 That leaves the
court’s vague reference to debate over the “private ownership” of
firearms, which inescapably implicates the Second Amendment.

party when considering the position of the gun owner from whom the weapon is stolen”) and
Finocchio v. Mahler, 37 S.W.3d 300, 303–04 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no proximate cause
in reckless shooting by a teenager with gun stolen from a friend’s house, which was stored
unlocked in a dresser drawer in the parents’ bedroom, because “the chain of causation included
three acts over which the owner had no control”).
139. 973 P.2d 1092 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1093–94.
142. See id. at 1094–95 (“[B]urglary is an all too common occurrence today, particularly in
urban and suburban settings, and . . . firearms are frequently stolen during a burglary.”).
143. Id. at 1095. The court also noted, as have other courts, that the defendant parents had
instructed their children not to enter their bedroom where the gun was kept and never to touch
guns. Id. at 1094. If children could be counted on to follow parental instruction at all times, the
world would be a much safer place. Unfortunately, as is common knowledge to anyone who has
ever been a child or parent, children frequently do not follow parental instructions. Studies show
that children are drawn to firearms and do not follow instructions to stay away from them. In one
study, twenty-nine groups of boys ages eight to twelve were placed in a room with some toys.
Geoffrey A. Jackman et al., Seeing Is Believing: What Do Boys Do When They Find a Real Gun?,
107 PEDIATRICS 1247, 1247–48 (2001). Concealed in a cabinet was a .38 caliber semiautomatic
handgun disabled from firing but equipped with a radio frequency device that would indicate to
researchers watching from the next room if and when the trigger was pulled. Id. at 1248. The boys
were told that they could play with the toys on top of the cabinet and could exit the room at any
time if they had questions or a problem, but they were not told to explore the room or open any
cabinets. Id. Nearly three-fourths of the groups opened the cabinet and found the gun within
fifteen minutes. Id. at 1249. More than three-fourths of the groups that found the gun played with
it. Id. Roughly half of the groups that handled the gun pulled the trigger. Id. More than 90% of
the boys who handled the gun and pulled the trigger had received some form of previous gun
safety instruction. Id. at 1248. Only one of the twenty-one groups that found the gun left the room
to inform an adult. Id.
144. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
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Another case leaving little explanation for the holding other than
deference to the Second Amendment is Holden v. Johnson,145 where a
Connecticut court became the first to be squarely faced with a properly
framed scope of liability argument. The defendant regularly kept a loaded
semiautomatic handgun in his bedroom in a dresser next to a tray
containing loose change.146 His daughter had a friend, Carl Johnson, with
a criminal record, who regularly visited the premises.147 According to the
complaint, the daughter “would, on occasion, retrieve change from the
aforesaid tray, including retrieval of change to provide bus money to Carl
Johnson[,] and [the daughter] was aware of the presence of said gun in
the dresser and of Carl Johnson’s interest in the gun.”148 Johnson stole
the gun during a visit and used it a week later to brutally murder the
plaintiff’s decedent.149
The court declined to impose liability because the defendant gun
owner had no knowledge of Johnson’s dangerous propensities.150
Plaintiff argued that was the wrong question, asserting, in line with the
above discussion, “that the proper focus of the court’s attention should be
whether the general risk was foreseeable-that is, whether the failure to
properly store a firearm will create a foreseeable risk that the firearm will
be stolen by a criminal and used for a criminal purpose.”151 The court did
not dispute the argument, saying only that it was “hesitant to accept
the . . . argument because, in effect, it would impose civil liability on
every gun owner who fails to properly store a gun that is stolen and then
used for criminal purposes,” and was “not persuaded that society is
prepared to extend the duties of gun owners that far.”152 When a court
rejects tort liability in a gun case not because of principles of tort law but
because of what the court believes society is prepared to accept, it is hard
to escape the conclusion that the court is deferring to notions of perceived
Second Amendment rights.

145. No. CV010811660, 2005 WL 1153739 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2005).
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id. at *1.
148. Id. at *2.
149. Id. at *1–2. The complaint alleged that Johnson and another man acted in concert to
abduct the victim and “force[] him at gunpoint to surrender the keys to his vehicle, reveal his PIN
number for automatic banking transactions, reenter his vehicle and accompany [them] as a
prisoner while [they] withdrew cash from his bank account, and exit the vehicle,” at which point
“[o]ne or both said defendants thereupon shot plaintiff’s decedent in the head, despite his pleas
for his life, killing him and leaving him in a ditch by the highway on-ramp.” Id. at *1.
150. Id. at *4.
151. Id. at *6. The plaintiff relied on the argument as I had articulated it in a previous article.
Id. at *6 n.1 (discussing plaintiff’s reliance on McClurg, Armed and Dangerous, supra note 7).
152. Id. at *6.
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Legislation also protects the right of individuals to act negligently in
securing firearms. In 2005, as part of the PLCAA153 and to advance
similar goals of protecting the gun industry and gun rights,154 Congress
passed the Child Safety Lock Act, which requires gun makers and sellers
to furnish a “secure gun storage or safety device”155 with the sale of any
handgun.156 While on the surface the Act would appear to be a
meaningful step toward promoting firearms security, it in fact represented
another advancement of the Second Amendment right to be negligent. As
previously discussed, gun makers and sellers usually comply with the Act
by providing easily thwarted childproofing locks not designed to prevent
or deter theft.157 Nevertheless, if a gun owner opts to use the device
(which is not mandated), the Act provides absolute tort immunity in state
and federal courts for criminal harm caused by an unauthorized user who
gains access to the firearm.158
Thus, if A buys a handgun accompanied by an external trigger lock
and uses the trigger lock, he is statutorily protected from liability as a
matter of law in the event B steals the gun, removes the trigger lock, and
criminally misuses the gun, without any opportunity for a fact finder to
evaluate whether use of a trigger lock is a reasonable means to protect
guns from theft. Illustrating this point is Estate of Arrington v. Michael,
153. See Open Letter from Audrey Stucko, Deputy Assistant Dir., Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, to Federal Firearms Licensees—Child Safety Lock Act of
2005 (Apr. 21, 2006), https://www.atf.gov/press/releases/2006/04/042106-openletter-ffl-childsafety-locks.html (notifying federal firearms licensees that “Public Law 109-92 (119 Stat. 2095),
the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, was enacted October 26, 2005,” and that section
5 of the law is the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005).
154. In addition to promoting safe gun storage and preventing unauthorized access to
firearms, a stated purpose of the Act was “to avoid hindering industry from supplying firearms to
law abiding citizens for all lawful purposes, including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and
competitive or recreational shooting.” Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 5(b), 119 Stat. 2095 (2005).
155. “[S]ecure gun storage or safety device” is defined as:
(A) a device that, when installed on a firearm, is designed to prevent the firearm
from being operated without first deactivating the device;
(B) a device incorporated into the design of the firearm that is designed to prevent
the operation of the firearm by anyone not having access to the device; or
(C) a safe, gun safe, gun case, lock box, or other device that is designed to be or
can be used to store a firearm and that is designed to be unlocked only by means
of a key, a combination, or other similar means.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) (2012).
156. Id. § 922(z)(1) (making it unlawful for any importer, manufacturer, or dealer to sell or
transfer a handgun without a secure gun storage or safety device as defined in id. § 921(a)(34)).
157. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(3) (granting tort immunity in state and federal courts for one who
uses a “secure gun storage or safety device” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(34) in the event
someone gains unauthorized access to the gun and criminally misuses it).
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where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
defendant, a police officer, was immune from suit under the Child Safety
Lock Act because he affixed a trigger lock to a gun in his bedroom even
though he left a key to the trigger lock in the same room.159 His son, who
had a violent criminal history and was the subject of a restraining order,160
took the gun and used it to murder his former partner.161 The plaintiff
argued that a reasonable jury could find that storing the key near the lock
was the “equivalent of not using the lock,”162 but the court held the matter
was purely a question of law163 and that using the trigger lock conferred
immunity under the Act.164
2. Thefts from Commercial Sellers
Thousands of firearms are stolen each year from FFLs through both
shoplifting and burglaries.165 In the first six months of 2014, thieves
shoplifted nine assault rifles and another firearm in three separate incidents
from the same Walmart Supercenter in Cordova, Tennessee, a suburb of
Memphis.166 News reports, which include surveillance video, indicate
assault rifles were plucked out of freestanding display cases on the open floor

159. 738 F.3d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 2013). A week before the murder, the son came to the
victim’s apartment and threatened to “cut her up” if she called the police, but she did so anyway.
Id. at 602. Despite knowing of this incident, the defendant left his service weapon in his home,
where the son maintained a room, and went on vacation to Florida. Id. at 601–02. The gun was
stored in a locked bedroom with a trigger lock affixed to it. See id. at 602–03. Ammunition for
the gun was hidden in a duffle bag in the same room. Id. at 603. The key to the trigger lock was
stored in a dresser in the same room. Id. Prior to leaving on vacation, the defendant left a note
behind for his son pleading with him to turn himself in, offering to pay him a $1500 bonus if he
did so and explaining he would get a “courtesy break” because the defendant was a police officer.
Id. at 602. He also left behind a copy of the victim’s affidavit of the protective order violation.
Id. After reading the affidavit, the son broke down the bedroom door and found the gun,
ammunition, and the key to the trigger lock. Id. at 603. He used the gun to shoot the victim to
death. Id.
160. The son had a long criminal record and history of violence against the victim. Id. at 601.
He was subject to a protective order to stay away from her. Id. His father knew of this violent
record, but allowed the son to live with him. Id.
161. Id. at 603.
162. Id. at 606.
163. Id. at 605.
164. Id. at 606–07.
165. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
166. See George Brown, Gun Thieves Hit Same Memphis Walmart for Third Time This Year,
NEWS CHANNEL 3 (June 3, 2014, 3:05 PM), http://wreg.com/2014/06/03/gun-thieves-hit-samememphis-walmart-for-third-time-this-year/ (reporting that two assault rifles were stolen from the
Cordova, Tennessee, Walmart on Jan. 27, 2014, seven others on Feb. 11, and one more on May
28, and listing the nine stolen assault rifles as three Colt M4 Carbines, a Diamond Back DB-15, a
DPM Panther Arms A-5, a Sigsauer 522, a Bushmaster XM15-e2s, and a Sigsauer Sigm400).
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while the store was open.167 It is uncertain how the thieves were able to
access the display cases, but one news report stated about the second theft:
“According to a police report, a manager told officers that the gun [display]
case was new and the keys were stuck to the back of the gun case.”168 As
any merchant, including, no doubt, Walmart, can well attest, shoplifting is
highly foreseeable.169
Burglaries of gun stores are also common. An internet search for “gun
store burglaries” turns up several incidents. A break-in at a gun store in Salina,
Kansas resulted in the loss of more than 100 guns and a large quantity of
ammunition.170 Thieves took forty guns in a burglary of a Mississippi gun
store.171 A gun store in Dacula, Georgia was “cleaned . . . out” hours after a
shipment of sixty-five guns had arrived and were put on display.172
Rational risk–utility analysis commands the exercise of an extremely
high amount of care on the part of commercial sellers to secure guns from
theft, both during and after business hours. They maintain large
inventories of firearms in one place and, as previously discussed, firearms
are prime targets for thieves.173 The probability of guns being stolen is
high and the gravity of the potential harm is multiplied by the large
number of guns collected in one place. When a burglar enters a car or
167. See id.; see also Jason Miles, Half Dozen Guns Stolen from Walmart, WMC ACTION
NEWS 5 (Feb. 14, 2014, 5:03 AM), http://www.wmcactionnews5.com/story/24721323/halfdozen-guns-stolen-from-walmart (reporting that “six ‘assault’ rifles were swiped from one of the
glass displays, plus a seventh weapon”).
168. Did They Use a Key? 9 Guns Stolen from Walmart Gun Safe, LOCAL MEMPHIS (Feb. 27,
2014, 10:17 PM), http://www.localmemphis.com/story/d/story/did-they-use-a-key-9-gunsstolen-from-walmart-gun/61243/dlCYfBmYhka6AcBJwTVvyQ.
169. The National Association for Shoplifting Prevention offers these statistics: annual
shoplifting losses exceed $13 billion, one in eleven Americans is a shoplifter, and “[m]ore than
10 million people have been caught shoplifting in the last five years.” The Shoplifting Problem in
the Nation, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SHOPLIFTING PREVENTION, http://www.shopliftingprevention.org/
what-we-do/learning-resource-center/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).
170. Large Number of Guns and Ammo Taken in Burglary, SALINA POST (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://salinapost.com/2014/04/15/large-number-of-guns-and-ammo-taken-in-burglary/ (reporting
that “100–120 handguns, 8–20 semi-automatic rifles, 8–12 knives, and nearly $5,000 in
ammunition” were stolen from Cleve’s Marine and Sporting Goods).
171. Angela Williams, 2 Charged in Gun Store Burglary, WAPT NEWS (Aug. 19, 2014, 8:12
AM), http://www.wapt.com/news/central-mississippi/2-charged-in-gun-store-burglary/27610462
(describing the arrest of two men for burglarizing a gun store in Kosciusko, Mississippi and
including an embedded video showing the men prying open locked glass cases).
172. Kristi Reed, $75,000 Worth of Guns Stolen During Big Gun Armory Burglary, DACULA
PATCH (Jan. 1, 2013), http://patch.com/georgia/dacula/75-000-worth-of-guns-stolen-during-biggun-armory-burglary#.VASQ3tF0ycx (explaining that the burglars “entered the store by
smashing the front door glass, reaching through the bars and unlocking the door,” but also quoting
the owner as stating that he had a double-keyed lock on the door until the fire marshal required
him to replace the inside lock with a twist lock).
173. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
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home, he usually does not know in advance whether a gun will be found.
When thieves target gun stores, it is because they are specifically intent
on stealing guns.
Nevertheless, with few exceptions, courts have shielded commercial
gun sellers from responsibility for failing to safeguard their inventories
from theft when stolen guns are used to inflict injury in a criminal attack.
They accomplish this result in one of two ways: first, by traveling down
the same wrong scope of liability path described above by demanding
foreseeability of the precise chain of events,174 and, second, by distorting
the nature and breadth of the duty entailed in practicing reasonable gun
security.175
Louria v. Brummett176 is an example of the former error. Two minors
stole two shotguns from a K-Mart store and used the guns to shoot a
deputy sheriff.177 The victim sued K-Mart, alleging a failure to take
proper measures to secure the guns from theft.178 In holding that the
alleged negligent storage was not a proximate cause of the shooting
because the resulting crime was unforeseeable,179 the court stated:
The minors committed their first crime by breaking into and
stealing guns from K-Mart. . . . Secondly, the minors the
following day broke into the Shinlever School. Finally, after
resisting arrest, the minors shot and wounded officer Louria.
For K-Mart to be liable, they would have had to foreseen a
crime upon a crime . . . .180
One judge concurred because he felt bound by precedent but recognized
that the court’s view of foreseeability was too restrictive.181
Analyzing foreseeability at the correct level of abstraction brings a
different result, as seen in Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., in which a
shooting victim sued the operator of a gun show.182 Four teenagers paid
admission and twice entered the defendant’s gun show despite a policy
prohibiting unsupervised minors.183 The boys stole several handguns,
which, according to one of them, was “easy” because they were “just
laying around” on tables.184 They used one of the guns to shoot the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra notes 123–38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189–95 and accompanying text.
916 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 930–31.
Id. at 931 (Franks, J., concurring).
637 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
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plaintiff, leaving him paralyzed.185 The court found that the defendant
owed a duty to prevent unsupervised minors from entering a gun show
where unsecured firearms are displayed and that the proximate cause
chain was not severed by the intervening criminals’ acts.186 The court
framed the scope of the risk question accurately, asking: “Should the
defendants have foreseen that children who successfully steal a firearm
and purchase suitable ammunition at its gun show would use the loaded
firearm in the pursuit of criminal activity?”187 Reasonable minds, the
court said, could answer this question affirmatively.188
A Maryland case arising from a retail gun theft skewed the analysis in
a different fashion—by exaggerating the nature of the burden and duty in
negligent storage cases. In Valentine v. On Target, Inc., two men stole
several handguns from a retail gun dealer.189 Two months later, an
unknown assailant used one of the guns to murder plaintiffs’ decedent.190
A wrongful death action asserted that the gun store owed a duty to
exercise reasonable care in displaying handguns to prevent theft.191 The
majority analyzed the issue in terms of duty (noting correctly that there
is no significant difference between a duty and proximate cause
analysis192) but rejected liability based on a red herring. The court
characterized the duty as one to protect the “world at large” from
criminals and concluded that such a broad duty would impose a
“tremendous burden” on gun sellers while providing only a “hypothetical
benefit to the public.”193
Certainly, a duty to protect the world at large from criminals would
impose an enormous burden with only a small chance of success, but that
is not the relevant duty in negligent gun security cases. The duty is closefitting and narrowly contained: the duty to safeguard a dangerous
instrumentality. Possessors of firearms, whether they are individuals or
commercial entities, are far and away the most efficient cost-avoiders in
the equation.194 A concurring judge in Valentine highlighted the court’s
defective reasoning on this point, stating that liability would not entail an
185. Id.
186. See id. at 409–10.
187. Id. at 410.
188. Id.
189. 727 A.2d 947, 948 (Md. Ct. App. 1999).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 949.
193. Id. at 951.
194. See Herland v. Izatt, 345 P.3d 661, 674 (Utah 2015) (indicating that public policy
supports placing injury costs on the party “best situated to take reasonable precautions to avoid
injury” and that in unauthorized access to firearm cases, imposition of a duty on the gun owner is
justified because “the burden on gun owners to properly restrict access to their firearms is
relatively slight” as compared to the risk).
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indefinite duty to protect society from harm but “would merely impose
upon a store owner a duty to exercise ordinary care in the storage and
display of handguns held out for sale to the public.”195
Any potential for the common law regarding the obligations of
commercial gun sellers to evolve was cut off in 2013 when the Alaska
Supreme Court held in Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe that the
PLCAA categorically bars claims of negligent security against FFLs for
harm resulting from a stolen gun.196 While the impact of Coxe could be
downplayed on the basis that it is a decision of a single state supreme
court, the court’s opinion appears to be a correct interpretation of the
PLCAA.
The estate of a man killed with a rifle taken from a Juneau gun store
sued the store and owner alleging negligent security.197 The defendants
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the PLCAA immunized the
defendants from negligent security claims.198 The court agreed, holding
that the PLCAA bars all claims against gun manufacturers, distributors,
and retail FFLs resulting from the criminal misuse of a firearm, subject
to the six exceptions enumerated in the PLCAA.199 “A plain reading of
[the Act],” the court said, “supports a prohibition on general negligence
actions—including negligence with concurrent causation.”200
Concluding that firearm thefts do not fall under any of the statutory
exceptions, the court said that in a bolded subheading: “Theft of a firearm
does not support liability under claims excepted from the PLCAA.”201
The implications of the holding are large. Assume the following
hypothetical:
195. Valentine, 727 A.2d at 954–55 (Raker, J., concurring) (agreeing with the result because
there was no evidence as to how the guns were stored); see also Kimbler v. Stillwell, 717 P.2d
1223, 1224–25 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing dismissal of the complaint in a case in which a
shotgun stolen from a store in a burglary was used to murder plaintiff’s decedent, disagreeing
with the trial court ruling that the plaintiff sought to impose a broad duty on the defendant to
prevent criminal acts by third parties, and stating that “[d]efendant’s duty . . . is that of a merchant
to display merchandise in a safe manner”).
196. 295 P.3d 380, 384 (Alaska 2013).
197. Id. at 385.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 388; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) (2012) (defining a prohibited “qualified
civil liability action” as including any claim against a manufacturer or seller of guns for damages
resulting from the unlawful misuse of a gun, subject to six enumerated exceptions).
200. Coxe, 295 P.3d at 386; see also id. at 388 (“In light of the PLCAA’s text and legislative
history, Congress’s purpose and intent was to bar any qualified civil liability action not falling
within a statutory exception. Our conclusion is supported by other courts that have held the
PLCAA bars simple negligence claims.”).
201. Id. at 393. A factual dispute existed as to whether the gun was acquired by sale or
through theft. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the rifle was stolen or
sold. Id. at 392–93.
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Joe is a federally licensed firearms dealer who operates a gun
store with an inventory of 350 firearms, most of which are
handguns. The firearms are not secured either during or after
hours. Many of the guns are in unlocked glass display cases,
plainly visible through the outside windows. The store has
no alarm system. On a Friday afternoon, Joe flips the “Open”
sign to “Closed,” locks the door, and goes home. That night
thieves remove an unsecured window air conditioning unit,
enter through the opening, and steal 150 handguns, several
of which begin showing up at crime scenes within a few
months.
Joe would bear no legal responsibility for the injuries under the Coxe
holding even assuming he acted unreasonably in securing the
inventory.202 Change the facts. Anxious to get home after a long week,
Joe simply forgets to lock the door when closing the store. The thieves
open the unlocked door, walk in, and clean the store out. Liability? Not
under the PLCAA and Coxe. Change the facts again. Joe gets drunk and
leaves the door wide open when he leaves for the night. Liability? It
would not appear so. While Joe’s conduct under these facts arguably
constitutes gross negligence or recklessness, the PLCAA contains no
exception to immunity for such conduct.
Gun thefts from retailers are an example of how the PLCAA connects
up the “Imprimatur through Inaction” and “Imprimatur through Action”
threads of the right to be negligent. The primary exception to immunity
from suit under the PLCAA is known as the “predicate exception,”
defined as an action in which a manufacturer or seller “knowingly
violated a state or federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing” of
firearms and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm.203 Statutes
imposing premises and operational security requirements on retail gun
sellers most likely would qualify as statutes “applicable to the sale or
marketing” of firearms; thus, violations of such statutes could give rise to
a claim under the predicate exception. As noted, however, as of this
writing, only nine states and the District of Columbia have such
statutes.204

202. ATF recommends that firearms dealers secure window air conditioning units in cages.
See ATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO FFLS, supra note 87, at 9 (“Evaluate other unsecured openings.
Does your premises have air conditioning units in open windows or a hole in an exterior wall?
These units are easily removed, and many theft entries are made in this way.”).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). The exception is called the predicate exception because the
violation of an applicable statute is a necessary predicate for maintaining an action.
204. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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III. THE TRICKLE-DOWN EFFECT OF THE RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT
Part II explained how the absence of legal requirements for firearms
security at both the federal and state level, as well as affirmative
protections of negligent conduct by courts and the federal Child Safety
Lock Act and PLCAA, have created a de facto right to be negligent,
rooted in the Second Amendment, in protecting firearms from theft. This
final Part suggests that the trickle-down effect of this state of the law is
the under-deterrence of reasonable conduct and a societal mindset that it
is permissible to act irresponsibly in keeping and safeguarding firearms.
Risk–utility analysis is grounded in the economic deterrence model of
tort law. To achieve optimal deterrence, the deterrence model holds that
tort liability rules are (or should be) designed to induce actors to expend
resources on safer behavior up to the point where the marginal cost of
increased safety exceeds the marginal reduction in injury costs.205 In
theory, economically efficient tort rules deter risky behavior that is not
cost-justified. If actors are required to internalize the costs of their
negligent conduct, they will be incentivized to invest effort and money in
safer conduct at appropriate levels.206
Gun makers, gun sellers, and gun owners, however, have never been
required to internalize the costs of harm caused by guns, with the result
that they are grossly under-deterred from investing in safer
manufacturing, distribution, or possession practices. Those costs are
enormous. Much has been written about them.207 In short, they include
more than 30,000 lives lost each year;208 roughly 80,000 annual nonfatal
intentional and unintentional injuries;209 lost productivity and earnings of

205. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 865–72 (1981).
206. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 16–17 (1987).
207. See generally PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS (2002)
(detailing the repercussions of gun violence).
208. See supra note 97.
209. Data tabulated from the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control’s Web-Based
Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS) showed 64,034 violence-related
nonfatal gunshot injuries in 2012. See Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System
(WISQARS), Nonfatal Injury Reports 2001–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html (select “Violent-Related” for intent of
injury option, “Firearm” for cause of injury option, and “2012 to 2012” for “Year(s) of Report”;
then follow “Submit Request” hyperlink). In the same year, an additional 17,362 persons were
injured in nonfatal unintentional shootings. Id. (select “Unintentional” for intent of injury option,
“Firearm” for cause of injury option, and “2012 to 2012” for “Year(s) of Report”; then follow
“Submit Request” hyperlink).
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gunshot victims;210 extraordinary medical costs borne largely by the
government (and, hence, taxpayers);211 lost quality of life;212 costs of
administering the criminal justice system and incarcerating gun
criminals;213 police and emergency services;214 fear;215 and grief.216
The deterrence model has been subject to decades of critique by those
who assert that a variety of practical factors make it impossible to achieve
210. Professors Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig estimated the lost lifetime earnings and value
of household services of each fatal gunshot victim to be between $460,000 and $580,000 after
adjusting the value downward to account for the fact that most firearms victims are of low
socioeconomic status and educational attainment. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 207, at 77.
211. A study of 2010 emergency department visits and hospital admissions for shooting
victims estimated the direct annual costs of medical treatment for firearms injuries to be $629
million per year. EMBRY M. HOWELL & PETER ABRAHAM, URBAN INST., THE HOSPITAL COSTS OF
FIREARMS ASSAULTS 4 tbl.1 (2013). The study found that victims of firearm assaults are
disproportionately uninsured, with the result that most of the treatment cost for their injuries is
shifted to taxpayers. Id. at 5. Only 16% of the treatment costs were covered by private insurance,
while 52% of costs were covered by government insurance, such as Medicaid, and 28% were
incurred by persons who were uninsured. Id. at 6 fig.7.
212. The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, an independent nonprofit
organization that provides research through grants or contracts to a long list of state and federal
government agencies, estimated the total cost of gun violence in 2010 to be as high as $174 billion.
Ted R. Miller, The Cost of Firearm Violence, CHILDREN’S SAFETY NETWORK (Dec. 2012),
http://www.childrenssafetynetwork.org/sites/childrenssafetynetwork.org/files/TheCostofGunVio
lence.pdf. The study estimated the societal cost of a single fatal firearms assault to exceed $5
million, the largest portion of which was for lost quality of life. Id. The estimated cost per fatal
firearm assault broke down as follows:
Work Loss: $1,552,381
Medical Care: $28,741
Mental Health: $10,883
Emergency Transport: $544
Police: $2,119
Criminal Justice: $395,221
Insurance Claims Processing: $2,361
Employer Cost: $8,980
Quality of Life (pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life for shooting
victims and their families): $3,093,750
Total Cost Per Fatal Firearm Assault: $5,094,980
Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See generally Mark Warr, Fear of Crime in the United States: Avenues for Research
and Policy, in 4 MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS OF CRIME & JUSTICE 451, 452 (David Duffee ed.,
2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04i.pdf (study of crime fear quoting an
assertion by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that
“[t]he most damaging of the effects of violent crime is fear and that fear must not be belittled”).
216. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of
Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (2005) (discussing studies showing the
disabling effects of grief resulting from the traumatic death of a loved one).
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optimal deterrence.217 But as Professor Gary Schwartz observed, critics
have often ignored the crucial distinction between the “strong deterrence”
model and the “modest deterrence” model,218 which could be renamed as
the “it works perfectly” and “it works, but not perfectly” models. While
conceding that optimal deterrence may be impossible to achieve,
Professor Schwartz conducted a sector-by-sector analysis (e.g.,
automobile accidents, medical malpractice, and products liability) of
available data and information, and concluded there is adequate support
for the effectiveness of the modest deterrence model.219
Reviewing criticisms of the deterrence model catalogued by Professor
Schwartz, it appears likely that in the context of stolen guns, the prospect
of tort liability would deter gun owners and gun sellers from unreasonable
conduct with respect to firearms gun security. First, gun storage and
security measures, or lack thereof, are the consequence of conscious
choices. Access to unsecured guns does not usually result from acts of
momentary inadvertence, which, as critics note, are unlikely to be
deterred by the threat of tort liability.220 Second, the critique that tort law
is not a “necessary cause” to deterring risky conduct because people can
be expected to act with due care out of moral obligation221 is not strong
with respect to a significant segment of gun sellers and owners. Firearms
storage studies222 and theft data223 demonstrate that a substantial
percentage of gun owners do not feel or exercise a moral responsibility
to secure guns from unauthorized users.
Third, the critique that tort law is not a “sufficient cause” for
deterrence because individual tortfeasors do not feel the effects of
liability due to liability insurance224 does not apply. Liability insurance
rarely enters the picture in gun theft cases, in large part because the law
so strongly favors gun sellers and owners that few lawsuits are ever
brought. If homeowner insurers were on the hook for injuries resulting
from negligent gun security, it would very likely enhance the deterrent
impact of the threat of tort liability. In an article about mandatory liability
insurance for gun owners, Professors Stephen Gilles and Nelson Lund
217. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381–87 (1994) (discussing common criticisms of the economic
deterrence model).
218. Id. at 387–89.
219. Id. at 422–23.
220. See id. at 385–86 (discussing the argument that tort liability does not deter inadvertent
negligence).
221. Id. at 382–83 (discussing the argument that society can rely on moral obligations to
deter risk-creating conduct).
222. See infra notes 237–42 and accompanying text (discussing firearms storage studies).
223. See supra notes 34–49 and accompanying text (discussing firearms theft data).
224. See Schwartz, supra note 217, at 382–83.
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(while arguing that mandatory coverage for intentional shootings would
be unconstitutional) noted that the benefits of mandatory insurance would
include educating gun owners about safe storage and giving them an
incentive in the form of lower premiums to follow safe storage
practices.225 Similar responses would be likely to follow the availability
of non-mandatory liability insurance if a realistic possibility of liability
existed. Currently, homeowner insurers do not even seek information
about gun ownership or storage practices from policy applicants,
although they do inquire about other household risks, such as animals,
swimming pools, and trampolines.226 In some states, insurers are
statutorily barred from denying coverage for firearms liability or charging
higher premiums based on household firearm possession.227
Another criticism of the deterrent model is that concern for personal
safety is a sufficient deterrent to engaging in risk-creating conduct,228 but
that concern is also absent with respect to firearms security practices.
Professor Schwartz pointed out that the concern for personal safety is a
strong motivating factor mostly in the area of transportation.229 Most
people drive safely primarily because they do not want to suffer the
consequences of an accident, not because of a fear of tort liability. While
concern about family safety motivates many, but by no means all, gun
owners to responsibly secure their firearms, gun owners do not take steps
to safely secure guns out of a concern for self-preservation. To the
contrary, one of the principal arguments against safe gun storage is that a
securely stored gun will not be readily available when needed for selfprotection.230

225. See Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Insurance as Gun Control?, REGULATION, Fall
2013, at 38, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2013/9/regv36n31n.pdf.
226. An insurance industry expert consulted for this Article, regarding whether insurance
companies inquire about firearms on homeowner policy application forms, surveyed a number of
agents, company executives, and consultants and reported back that, with one exception, none had
seen such a question from a liability perspective. The exception was an insurer that asked about
assault weapons until, reportedly, the NRA complained to the state insurance department. Email
from Bill Wilson, Director, Virtual Univ., Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers of Am., to Andrew Jay
McClurg, (July 11, 2014, 9:34 CST) (on file with author).
227. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 626.9541(g)(4) (2015) (classifying as “unfair discrimination”
denying coverage or charging a higher premium to lawful firearms owners); GA. CODE ANN. § 3324-30.1 (2015) (prohibiting insurance companies from excluding or denying coverage because
the insured, insured’s family member, or insured’s employee lawfully keeps or carries firearms
on the insured’s property).
228. Schwartz, supra note 217, at 383 (discussing the argument that risky conduct is
sufficiently deterred by a concern for personal safety).
229. Id.
230. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the deterrence model is critiqued on the basis that many
individuals act without knowledge that their conduct could subject them
to a lawsuit.231 My involvement in the firearms policy debate for more
than two decades has taught me that no group of Americans is more in
tune with or knowledgeable about their issue realm than gun owners, in
large part because of the effective job that the blogosphere and gun
lobbying organizations do in getting the word out about developments,
legal and otherwise, in the area. Knowledge of the existence of potential
tort liability for harm caused with stolen guns would likely be
disseminated quickly and in a saturated fashion.
Accordingly, there are reasons to believe a credible threat of tort
liability would incentivize lawful gun owners and sellers to exercise
reasonable care in keeping guns out of the hands of thieves. Similarly, an
affirmative mandate of reasonable gun security practices in the form of
legislative or regulatory rules could be expected to have a deterrent effect
on lawful gun owners and sellers, as most could be expected to follow the
law.232 But in the topsy-turvy world of guns in America, the legal system
has essentially abandoned the deterrence model as a means for promoting
safe conduct in securing the most dangerous product. As seen throughout
this Article, the law imposes almost no expectations on the most efficient
cost-avoider—gun possessors.
A byproduct of this state of affairs is a lax attitude by many gun
owners toward their responsibility for safeguarding firearms from theft.
Anecdotally, in many discussions regarding safe firearms storage, in class
discussions, at presentations, and informally, I am frequently surprised
by the low degree of obligation many gun owners feel toward protecting
guns from access by unauthorized users. Many of these discussions occur
in my law school firearms policy seminar course. Most of the students
who enroll in the course are strong believers in gun rights. They are
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible people, except, for some of them,
when it comes to firearms security. As an example, during a class
discussion of the Holden case, where the gun owner left a loaded pistol
in a dresser, which was stolen by his daughter’s friend and used for
murder,233 a student spoke up and said, “I leave my loaded gun on top of
my nightstand so I can get to it in hurry.” The comment led to a colloquy
along the following lines:
Me: Like, including right now, when you’re in class?
Student: Uh-huh.
231. See Schwartz, supra note 217, at 386–87.
232. Obviously, criminals and other illegal gun owners would be unlikely to be deterred
either by the threat of tort liability or affirmative legislative duties.
233. See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
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Me: Do you have roommates?
Student: Yes.
Me: Do they bring friends over?
Student: Yes.
Me: Have units in your apartment building ever been
burglarized?
Student: All the time. That’s one reason I have the gun.
Me: Don’t you think it’s risky to leave a loaded handgun
laying around in plain view? Maybe even negligent?234
One empirical indicator of the trickle-down impact on the right to be
negligent is simply the massive number of guns stolen each year, as
discussed in Part I.235 Unfortunately, without more data, there is no way
of knowing whether gun thefts are going up, down, or staying the same.
Nor, given the fact that many stolen guns are never reported,236 can
comparisons be drawn to thefts of other valuable products, such as
automobiles, which presumably get reported in nearly all instances.
A stronger empirical indicator can be found in the dismal patterns of
firearms storage in households documented by numerous studies.237 Most
of the studies involve surveys of parents conducted at pediatrics
234. To the student’s credit, she told me later in the semester that she was looking into buying
a gun safe. It is important to emphasize that many gun owners are highly responsible. Following
a class discussion similar to the one recounted in the text, I stopped by the law school security
desk to talk with the campus police officer. One of my students had mentioned that the officer is
a champion marksman whose picture hangs prominently on the wall of one of the largest gun
stores in Memphis. I asked the officer her views on safe gun storage, not knowing what to expect
as a response. She launched into a passionate argument about the high degree of responsibility
gun owners bear to protect guns from theft, offering as an example a recent vacation trip to
Florida. She explained that she had lawfully transported her handgun there by plane and rented a
car on arrival. Like many states, Florida has a reciprocity statute honoring handgun carry permits
from other states. See FLA. STAT. § 790.015 (2015) (allowing nonresidents to carry a concealed
weapon if, among other restrictions, the nonresident is from a state that honors Florida’s concealed
weapon laws and licenses). The officer’s personal vehicle in Memphis is equipped with a secure
gun lockbox bolted to the trunk. The rental car, of course, had no such lockbox. She explained
that before entering any premises prohibiting the carrying of firearms, she used her police
handcuffs—“and not the ones with a universal key that many people could have”—to secure the
gun, via the trigger guard, to the vehicle’s chassis in the locked trunk. Relating this story to my
students, some were surprised by what they saw as “extraordinary care.” I disagreed, expressing
the opinion that, given the magnitude of the risk, it was “reasonable care under the circumstances.”
235. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
237. See generally McClurg, Armed and Dangerous, supra note 7, at 1190–1200 (discussing
ten studies of gun storage practices).
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clinics.238 While the findings vary, studies have found that as many as
50% of all handguns are stored unlocked,239 that ammunition is stored
unlocked in approximately one-third of households,240 and that as many
as 1.6 million children live in a home with at least one loaded and
unlocked firearm.241 A 2007 national study determined that just over onethird of parents in households with guns and children stored their guns
safely.242 Because the studies are survey-based, it is reasonable to believe
they understate the magnitude of the deficiencies in household storage
practices because many respondents presumably would not want to
confess to strangers that they store guns or ammunition in ways that
endanger children.
Behavioral law and economics theory may also suggest that the right
to be negligent with respect to firearms security has crept into the public
psyche. In their groundbreaking article, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, the authors hypothesized that in determining the
probability of events in making negligence determinations, juries are
subject to hindsight bias.243 This occurs because jurors are required to
assess the probability that a particular harm would follow from the
defendant’s act already knowing that the harm did in fact occur.244 The
result is that jurors may overestimate the probability of harm in
conducting a cost–benefit analysis of the defendant’s conduct, leading to
the imposition of too much tort liability.245 The same phenomenon
presumably would affect judges as well in ruling on dispositive motions
such as motions for dismissal, summary judgment, or directed verdict.

238. The gun lobby has fought, with some success, to prohibit doctors from asking patients
about gun ownership. See James Hamblin, The Question Doctors Can’t Ask, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11,
2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/08/doctors-cant-ask-aboutguns/375566/ (discussing a Florida statute that prohibits doctors from inquiring about gun
ownership or discussing gun safety with patients, a lawsuit by Florida physicians challenging the
statute as a First Amendment violation, the decision of a federal district court declaring the statute
unconstitutional, and the 2–1 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals reversing the district court
and upholding the statute).
239. See Yvonne D. Senturia et al., Children’s Household Exposure to Guns: A Pediatric
Practice-Based Survey, 93 PEDIATRICS 469, 471 (1994).
240. See id. (stating that 32% of gun owners reported storing ammunition unlocked).
241. Gail Stennies et al., Firearm Storage Practices and Children in the Home, United
States, 1994, 153 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 586, 588 (1999).
242. Robert H. DuRant et al., Firearm Ownership and Storage Patterns Among Families
with Children Who Receive Well-Child Care in Pediatric Offices, 119 PEDIATRICS e1271, e1275
& tbl.2 (2007) (reporting these figures and citing studies).
243. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1523–24 (1998).
244. Id. at 1523.
245. Id. at 1524.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/1

44

McClurg: The Second Amendment Right to be Negligent

2016]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT

45

But in the area of harm resulting from access to unsecured firearms,
the case law belies these assumptions. Consider Gordon v. Hoffman,
where the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to overturn a jury verdict
that found no liability on the part of a gun owner who left an unsecured,
loaded rifle in a house occupied only by his fifteen-year-old daughter and
several unrelated younger children (ages five through thirteen) for whom
she was babysitting.246 The fifteen-year-old removed the loaded rifle
from a closet, assuming it to be unloaded, to show it to the other
children.247 She then left the room and in a struggle between two boys for
possession of the rifle, the gun discharged, killing plaintiff’s five-yearold child.248 Although the trial record was incomplete, the court said the
jury apparently believed that the defendant was negligent but that the
“negligence was not a direct cause” of the injury.249 Such a conclusion
would be curious inasmuch as Minnesota, like all states, has long
recognized that foreseeable intervening causes, even criminal acts, do not
break the chain of causation.250
Given that the jurors not only knew such a harm had happened in the
case before them but were most likely aware that such incidents happen
regularly (they occur hundreds of times each year251), the jurors certainly
did not appear to be overestimating probability. They either
underestimated it or possibly did not care about it one way or another
based on a belief that people should not bear a responsibility to lock up
their guns. In either situation, it is difficult to defend the verdict under
any rational cost–benefit analysis. How could one not be held responsible
for leaving a loaded, accessible firearm in a house full of unsupervised
children? The risk that made the conduct negligent is exactly what
happened. As a dissenting justice observed, “It is hard to imagine a more
volatile or potentially disastrous situation than that created by this
defendant.”252
246. 303 N.W.2d 250, 250–52 (Minn. 1981).
247. Id. at 250–51.
248. Id. at 251.
249. Id. at 252.
250. See, e.g., Raleigh v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 275 N.W.2d 572, 574, 576 (Minn. 1978) (finding
no error in the jury verdict for the student victim against the school district because a fellow
student’s misconduct in slitting the victim’s wrist was foreseeable when school district, aware of
existing racial tensions, failed to exercise ordinary care in supervising the students attending a
documentary movie); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 245 N.W.2d
186, 189–90 (Minn. 1976) (reversing the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the
verdict to a corporation whose stolen truck was involved in an accident because the jury could
have found that theft was a foreseeable result of an employee leaving the keys in the truck’s
ignition in a high crime rate area).
251. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
252. Gordon, 303 N.W.2d at 253 (Otis, J., dissenting).
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Other examples of juries returning victories for defendants in cases
involving objectively unreasonable gun security exist,253 and this Article
has discussed several cases where judges acted similarly. While the cases
do not empirically prove anything, they certainly do not suggest, as
behavioral law and economics theory would predict, that juries or judges
are overestimating probabilities of harm in unauthorized gun access
situations with the result of imposing more liability.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the disheartening level of responsibility that
the law, and through it, the American public, have come to accept from
individual gun owners and retail gun sellers to safeguard firearms from
theft. Despite the fact that hundreds-of-thousands of guns are stolen each
year254 and that a high percentage of crime guns are the product of
theft,255 the U.S. legal system is bankrupt of tools to deter dangerous,
unreasonable firearms security. The law imposes virtually no obligation
on the most efficient cost-avoider in the equation: possessors of firearms.
Cases have been discussed in which judges and juries refused to hold
responsible even grossly negligent defendants who left, with deadly
results, loaded handguns unguarded, unlocked, and readily accessible to
criminals and other unauthorized users.
That these conditions are the result of unwarranted deference to
expansive views of the Second Amendment can be seen not only in the
absence of legislation (except in a small number of states) mandating
firearms security,256 but also in federal legislation, such as the PLCAA
and the Child Safety Lock Act, that affirmatively protects—expressly in
the name of the Second Amendment—negligent conduct that facilitates
gun thefts.257 Common law courts have been just as deferential. This
Article showed how, in case after case, courts have distorted fundamental
scope of liability principles to avoid imposing legal responsibility
commensurate with the risk of possessing firearms to safeguard them
from thieves.258
253. See Blackwell v. Cantrell, 315 S.E.2d 29, 30, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the jury
verdict finding no negligence for grandparents who kept a loaded pistol in a dresser drawer in
their bedroom, which their grandchildren accessed with the result that one grandchild shot the
other); Oldham v. Nerolich, 452 N.E.2d 225, 226 (Mass. 1983) (affirming the jury verdict finding
no negligence for the landowner whose nephew and eleven-year-old friend, playing on the porch,
entered the landowner’s unlocked house and found a loaded rifle in the closet with the result that
the nephew shot his friend).
254. 2012 ATF STOLEN GUNS REPORT, supra note 8, at 5–6; see supra notes 34–43 and
accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 12–15, 153–64, 196–201 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 119–52 and accompanying text.
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As explained in the Introduction, the issue of stolen guns is just a
sliver of a much larger issue. As a nation, our legal system has made the
irrational, not simply unwise, choice to confer near complete immunity
from responsibility on those who make, purvey, and possess the only
legal product designed and intended to kill and injure people. This Article
explained how rather than seeking optimal deterrence of injury-causing
behavior, U.S. law may have the perverse effect of actually encouraging
it.
During the writing of this Article, a lawyer sought my counsel in a
case in which his client was shot with a stolen assault rifle. An employer
had allowed an employee to keep the firearm, unsecured, on the
employer’s premises. A co-employee with a violent felony record stole
the gun and used it in the shooting. The lawyer contacted me after a
hearing on a motion for summary judgment, explaining that he was
baffled by the cold reception he received from the trial judge. “I don’t
understand it. Is it me or the law?” he asked. “It’s the law,” I said. “I call
it the Second Amendment right to be negligent.”
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